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Demanding Power: Struggles over 
Fuel Access in Nigeria 
Martin Atela, Ayobami Ojebode, Tade Aina, John Agbonifo, Marjoke 




Why do some fuel protests in Nigeria lead to a response from government, but 
others are barely noticed? What are the politics behind government response 
and who are the winners and losers? Using a multi-method approach, this study 
focuses on the period between 2007–2017 to investigate the dynamics of fuel 
protest in Nigeria to ask how, and under which conditions, struggles over energy 
access in Nigeria produce accountability and empowerment. 
Although the protests on energy access have elicited some response from the 
government (accountability) such as a short-term downward review of fuel 
prices, they have hardly ever led to any long-term organisational or structural 
changes nor do they benefit, maximally, the marginalised and less powerful who 
form the bulk of the protesters. Instead, the protests can become a platform for 
opposition politicians who capitalise on government failure to push their own 
political agendas in an attempt to wrest power. Because the protests require 
some level of organising and material provisioning to be effective, those who 
possess these skills and resources may prioritise their own interests. As a result, 
citizens feel disempowered as they are convinced the government is 
inaccessible.  
The findings suggest that accountability and empowerment outcomes of the 
struggles over fuel access in Nigeria are severely limited by the very conditions 
that define the state as fragile: weak institutions, elite capture, widespread 
corruption, and a citizenry that is protest-fatigued and disempowered. This could 
be true of other fragile and conflict-affected settings. Therefore, frameworks that 
open up the civic space for dialogues between the government and citizens may 
produce better outcomes than protests. 
Keywords 
Nigeria; accountability; empowerment; energy struggles; fuel protests; fuel 
subsidies; fragile settings. 
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In Nigeria, why have some protests about fossil fuel access or price led to a shift 
in government policy or position, while others have barely been noticed? Why 
have some turned into major episodes of popular resistance in the past decade, 
despite sometimes heavy-handed repression from the government? What 
accounts for the different types of government response to these energy 
protests? To what extent have these protests led to accountability in 
government? This paper presents findings from a study of episodes of protests in 
Nigeria, with an emphasis on the period between 2007 and 2017. The history of 
Nigeria, both under military dictatorship and the commencement of democratic 
rule in 1999, is the history of how energy, particularly fossil fuels, has shaped 
politics and conflicts (Lewis 2018). Since the early 1970s, there have been more 
than thirty attempts by the Nigerian government to increase the price of petrol, 
each sparking popular protests of varying degrees (see Table 1.1), some 
attracting thousands of people in various locations across the country, including 
Lagos, Kaduna, Benin City, and Kano.  
This study investigated the key drivers of the protests, as well as the outcomes, 
focusing on negotiations and contentions over fossil fuel subsidies and their 
effects on accountability and empowerment. It is part of the Action for 
Empowerment and Accountability (A4EA) programme’s ‘Demanding Power’ 
research project. A4EA is an international research collaboration exploring how 
social and political action contributes to empowerment and accountability in 
fragile, conflict, and violent contexts. The Demanding Power project, carried out 
in Mozambique, Nigeria and Pakistan has been designed to understand how and 
under which conditions struggles over energy access in fragile and conflict-
affected settings empower people to hold public authorities to account. By 
‘access’ we refer to both affordability and availability. The research has the 
objective of deepening and diversifying the body of evidence on the contexts in 
which contentions and negotiations over energy occur, how these are framed in 
popular narratives, and what collective, individual, national and international 
interests are at play.  
The paper consists of seven sections. Section 1 introduces the research and 
provides contextual information on the study country – Nigeria. Section 2 lays out 
the methodology applied to address the research questions, including how these 
were adapted to the Nigerian context. Section 3 looks at why struggles around 
energy in Nigeria specifically appear to have the potential to grow into significant 
episodes of contention. Consideration is given to what issues make the Nigerian 
context fragile and how these are intertwined with energy struggles driven by the 
billion-dollar fuel subsidy regime. Section 4 assesses whether popular struggles 
in Nigeria have strengthened government accountability concerning energy 
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access. In section 5, the study examines whether struggles over fuel pricing and 
subsidies caused a shift that favours ordinary citizens in terms of energy 
provisioning policies. Section 6 reviews the role of several transnational actors in 
Nigeria’s political economy of fuel subsidies. Section 7 summarises the study 
findings, providing an overall evaluation of the accountability and empowerment 
effects of energy struggles, and concluding with the study findings’ implications 
in the broader context of global and national fossil fuel subsidy reforms and 
energy sector governance. 
1.1 Background 
Across the world, energy prices, subsidies, and availability have very often 
become flashpoints for social mobilisation, protest, and demands for government 
accountability. These issues have found recent expression in the gilet jaune 
movement in France, and in passionate protests in Zimbabwe. In state contexts 
characterised by fragility, conflict and violence, some evidence suggests that 
such protests may take on a particular character, have distinct meanings, and 
may play a role in wider understandings and expressions of accountability 
(Hossain and Scott-Villiers 2017). However, there is limited academic evidence 
specifically on popular struggles around energy access in developing countries. 
We know particularly little about whether and how these struggles and actions 
contribute to the long-term capacity of citizens to hold states to account. 
Building on available evidence, this study investigated how access to energy 
acts as a conduit for social and political mobilisation in fragile and conflict-
affected contexts. Its aim is to:  
− Deepen our understanding of the salience of energy access amongst poor 
and excluded people in low-income contexts; 
− Expand understandings of contentious and unruly politics, and what has been 
termed ‘the politics of provisions’ – the place that access to certain goods 
takes in the bargain between the people and public authorities, often in the 
absence of a wider social contract on rights, services, and public goods; 
− Grow the understanding of the political economy of energy reforms - an area 
of substantial policy interest. 
The evidence generated in this research should inform any reforms on fuel 
subsidies in Nigeria given the broad national and global policy consensus 
against fossil fuel subsidies on both ecological and economic grounds. The 
evidence could support ongoing efforts in Nigeria to reform the oil sector 
including the withdrawal of fuel subsidies. 
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1.2 Country context: Energy access and use in 
Nigeria 
Nigeria is Africa’s most populous country with an estimated population of 200 
million (NBS 2018), and its largest economy with a gross domestic product of 
over US$398 billion in 2018 (IMF 2019a). It is Africa’s largest oil producer and 
the sixth largest producer of oil and gas in the world. It holds an estimated oil 
reserve of 36.2 billion barrels, and vast proven natural gas reserves1 located 
mainly along the Niger Delta, Gulf of Guinea, and Bight of Bonny. Oil and gas 
are Nigeria’s key drivers of economic growth and development, supporting job 
creation, revenue generation, and foreign exchange earnings through exports.   
Although Nigeria is a major producer, it is unable to refine its crude oil to meet 
local demand. As a result, it resorts to exporting its crude oil and importing 
refined products. The landing and pump prices of these products are too high for 
most people to afford. This is because about 54 per cent of Nigerians are 
described as ‘multidimensionally poor’ and inequality remains a hallmark of the 
country’s socioeconomic development: Nigeria ranks 152 out of 187 in inequality 
rankings (MPPN 2018). Given the importance of petroleum products for 
socioeconomic growth, the Nigerian government has historically subsidised the 
prices of imported petroleum products. Thus, fuel subsidies became a major 
social welfare scheme that Nigerians enjoy. 
However, the process of providing subsidies involves multiple actors: the 
government, its parastatal in charge of petroleum, importers, distributors, final 
vendors, and consumers. The process is not only complex, but also shrouded in 
opaque dealings. Ordinary citizens, trade unions, the media, and a range of 
interest groups have come to believe that subsidies are essential public benefits 
and are, therefore, heavily invested both politically and commercially in 
government regulatory actions. The politics of petroleum subsidies in Nigeria is 
not only contentious, but also volatile because it is often linked to the unequal 
distribution of oil wealth across individual, ethnic, and regional lines. The bitter 
nature of fuel subsidy politics at both the personal and structural levels has been 
acknowledged by important Nigerian political figures such as President Goodluck 
Jonathan and the former Minister of Finance, Dr Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala (Jonathan 
2018; Okonjo-Iweala 2018).  
Yet, crude oil and natural gas do not constitute the only sources of energy in a 
country as resource-rich as Nigeria. There is a large reserve of other non-
renewable energy resources including coal and nuclear fuels. The country is also 
endowed with renewable energy sources including biomass, hydropower, solar, 
 
1  Authorities disagree widely on the estimated proven gas reserves in Nigeria: OPEC (2020) says it is 
over 5,000 billion cubic metres while Nigeria’s Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR 2020) claim it 
is about 203 trillion cubic feet which is about 5,000 billion cubic metres. However, while these details 
differ, the overall point is that these reserves are vast. 
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and wind power, all of which could contribute to Nigeria’s capacity to be energy 
sufficient (Ighodaro 2010). Despite these vast energy resources and the wealth 
generated from their appropriation, Nigerians continue to experience energy 
shortages. The gap between energy supply and demand has been attributed to 
inadequate development and poor management of the energy sector (Oyedepo 
2012). A critical example of this is the highly deficient on-grid electricity supply 
system. Although recent efforts have been made by the government to boost 
electricity generation, Nigeria’s current total installed capacity is 12,522 
megawatts (MW), of which 10,142MW is thermal (mainly powered by oil or gas-
fired plants), and 2,380MW is from hydroelectric sources (USAID 2020).   
To put this into context, South Africa, a country with about 58 million people, 
despite its ongoing electricity challenges, has a total installed capacity of 
58,095MW (USAID 2021). In fact, the most recent World Bank data, 
disaggregated based on kilowatt-hours per capita in countries, indicates that the 
average South African citizen uses thirty times more energy than the average 
Nigerian (World Bank 2014). Access to electricity in Nigeria, though 
characterised by unstable supply and frequent cuts, has gradually increased 
from 40 per cent of the population in 2000 to 60 per cent of the population in 
2018 (Lighting Africa 2019). However, there is a rural-urban divide. Only 41.1 per 
cent of people living in rural areas have access to electricity compared to 86 per 
cent of those living in urban areas (Lighting Africa 2019). This demonstrates that 
the poorest and most vulnerable Nigerians, who constitute the majority of the 
population, are also the most affected by an inadequate supply of electricity. 
Energy needs and access in Nigeria vary along socio-economic status, 
residence (rural versus urban), regional divides (northern versus southern 
Nigeria), as well as gender. The secondary and tertiary sectors of the Nigerian 
economy, for instance manufacturing and transportation, rely heavily (though not 
exclusively) on petroleum products for their energy requirements. Many 
Nigerians, especially urban residents, are forced to invest in inefficient and 
dangerous diesel-powered or petrol-powered generators, as well as kerosene 
stoves, for their commercial and domestic energy needs. In 2021, Nigeria’s daily 
petrol consumption was estimated at 93 million litres (Oladipo 2021). This 
consumption is higher than any other African country. However, a majority of 
households in rural areas rely on fuel wood for cooking. An estimated 50 million 
plus tonnes of fuel wood are used annually in Nigeria, largely supplied by sellers 
operating within the informal economy (Oyedepo 2012; NBS 2018).  
The overreliance on unclean and unregulated energy sources by rural 
households is not only cultural, dating back centuries, but is also caused by the 
unreliable supply and high cost of petroleum products in rural areas. In some 
cases, the cost of petroleum products such as kerosene and gasoline in rural 
areas is estimated to be in excess of 150 per cent of official pump prices 
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(Oyedepo 2012), an indication that fuel subsidies and reforms do not always 
achieve the desired impact.  
The impact of the high costs is felt most by women. A recent large-scale survey 
assessing the gendered impacts of fossil fuel subsidy reform in Nigeria found 
that while subsidies directed at kerosene and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) did 
bring down the official prices, hoarding and other sharp practices keep the price 
that women pay for these items high. In fact, some women pay two to six times 
the official sales price despite US$3.38bn spent on kerosene subsidies between 
January 2012 and July 2013 (Merrill et al. 2019). Subsidies and reforms meant to 
serve women as primary purchasers of kerosene have failed to benefit them 
because the subsidy is not targeted to poor households, or women, but to 
anyone who buys the fuel (Merrill et al. 2019). Moreover, unofficial price 
increments and persistent kerosene supply challenges means that poor people 
end up being overcharged by informal dealers who have a better link to them. 
This may be why the stoppage of the kerosene subsidy in 2016 attracted little or 
no protest.   
1.3 Historical overview: Fossil fuels and protests 
in Nigeria 
Popular protests over access to utilities and resources (including fossil fuels), 
regulated and/or owned by the government, have a long history in Nigeria dating 
back to the late nineteenth century (Okonkwo 1995; Adebayo 2020). Before the 
discovery of crude oil in commercial quantity in 1956, coal mining generated the 
main fossil fuel related protests in Nigeria. Nigeria has a proven coal reserve 
estimated at 54 million metric tons, most of which is found in Enugu in the south-
eastern part of the country (Adebayo 2020).  
The Iva Valley massacre at the Enugu Colliery in 1949 is perhaps the most 
violent fossil fuel related protest in Nigeria’s history. Colliery trade unions, 
dissatisfied with their working conditions, embarked on a strike in November 
1949, after other attempts at collective bargaining had failed. Their decision to 
proceed with the strike annoyed the colonial superintendent of police, F. S. 
Philip. He ordered his men to open fire on the workers, killing at least 21 people 
and wounding 51 others (Jaja 1982; Brown 2003). This incident was one of a 
number of critical events that kindled the fire of nationalism which culminated in 
Nigerian independence in 1960. 
Despite the significance of the Iva Valley massacre, fossil fuel related protests 
have been few and far between in Nigeria until the 1980s, by which point oil had 
overtaken coal as the prime energy source. Coal’s share of total energy 
production in Nigeria declined from 98 per cent in 1958, to 1.6 per cent in 1966 
as the government increasingly saw oil as a cheaper alternative (Adebayo 2020). 
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There is no record of coal production at all during the Nigerian Civil War (1967–
1970). The oil boom of the 1970s resulted in a massive inflow of new revenue for 
Nigeria, and irreversibly eroded the importance of coal as a resource worthy of 
government investment (Adebayo 2020). As petroleum increasingly became 
Nigeria’s most important natural resource, any fluctuation in its prices or supply 
began to have a direct impact on the economy and, by extension, all aspects of 
national life. The most significant event that transformed the nature of fossil fuel 
related protests in Nigeria was the introduction of the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF)-led structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) 
in 1986. The impact of deregulation and the adoption of market-driven pricing 
policies - which included high inflation, devaluation of the Naira, and 
unemployment - inflicted untold hardship on the Nigerian population. The inability 
of the state to meet the needs of the populace was met with increasing popular 
protests. 
Table 1.1 chronicles attempts to remove or reduce the fuel subsidy by different 
Nigerian administrations and how this has been received by the citizens. A 
cursory look at the trajectory of struggles and their consequences in Nigeria 
suggests that in many instances struggles over fuel pricing and subsidies caused 
a shift of power in favour of the citizens when it came to energy provisioning 
policies. For instance, more than half of the citizen protests against fuel price 
rises led to either a downward review of the pump price of petrol or the 
introduction of social welfare palliatives or both (see Table 1.1). We return to this 
in subsequent sections. 
Table 1.1 Attempts to remove or reduce subsidy 
by different Nigerian administrations 
Year President/Head of 
State 
Change in price 
[k=kobo; N=naira] 
Remarks 
1973 Yakubu Gowon 6k to 8.45k 40.8% increase 
1976 Murtala Muhammed 8.45k to 9k  6.5% increase 
1978 Olusegun Obasanjo 9k to 15.3k 70% increase 
1982 Shehu Shagari 15.3k to 20k 30.7% increase 
1986 Ibrahim Babangida 20k to 39.5k 97.5% increase 
1988 Ibrahim Babangida 39.5k to 42k  6.3% increase 
1989 Ibrahim Babangida 42k to 60k  42.9% increase 
1991 Ibrahim Babangida 60k to70k  16.7% increase 
1993 Ernest Shonekan  70k to N5  614.3% increase 
1993 Sani Abacha N5 to N3.25k 35% decrease 
1994 Sani Abacha N3.25k to N15 361.5% increase 
1994 Sani Abacha N15 to N11 26.67% decrease 
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N11 to N25 127.3% increase 
1999 Abdulsalami 
Abubakar 
N25 to N20 25% decrease 
2000 Olusegun Obasanjo N20 to N30  50% increase 
2000 Olusegun Obasanjo N30 to N22  26.7% decrease 
after protests2 
2002 Olusegun Obasanjo N22 to N26  18.2% increase 
2003 Olusegun Obasanjo N26 to N42 61.5% increase 
(protests but no 
decrease) 
2004 Olusegun Obasanjo N42 to N50 19.1% increase 
2004 Olusegun Obasanjo N50 to N65  30% increase 
2007 Olusegun Obasanjo N65 to N75 15.4% increase 
(protests but no 
decrease) 




2012 Goodluck Jonathan N65 to N141 116.92% increase 
2012 Goodluck Jonathan N141 to N97 31.2% decrease 
after protests 
2015 Goodluck Jonathan N97 to N87 10.31% decrease 
as election 
approached 
2016 Muhammadu Buhari N87 to N145 66.67% increase 
2020  Muhammadu Buhari N145 to N124 14.5% decrease 
(market forces3) 
2020  Muhammadu Buhari N124 to N123 0.81% decrease 
(market forces) 
2020 Muhammadu Buhari N123 to band of 
N140 - N145 
Market forces 
2020 Muhammadu Buhari Band of N140 - 
N145 to band of 
N145 - N148 
Market forces 
2020 Muhammadu Buhari Band of 145-148 to 
price cap of N151 
Market forces 
Source: Authors’ compilation from multiple sources 
 
2  ’Price adjustments’ often occurred by the pump price of petrol going up, attracting protests, then the 
government responding by reducing the increase by a fraction, but not reversing it totally. In effect, the 
new price was still higher than the pre-increase price. 
3  What we have referred to here as ‘market forces’ is a regime of partial regulation. The Nigerian 
government sets the band or boundary within, and not beyond, which prices can increase or decrease. 
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In the analysis in this paper, we give more attention to the 2007 and 2012 fuel 
protests than to others because our event catalogue shows that these were the 
most widespread, prolonged and violent fuel protest episodes in recent times. 
See tables in the Annexe for a detailed description of the 2007, 2012 and 2016 
protest episodes.   
The 2007 episode is of particular interest because the fuel hike was introduced 
by the outgoing government of Olusegun Obasanjo, which announced a 
reduction of state subsidy on petrol and kerosene pushing the prices from N65 to 
N75 per litre just six days before leaving office. It is also worth noting that the 
withdrawal came despite over N350bn being appropriated in the 2007 budget for 
the purposes of a pump price subsidy on petrol and kerosene (Simpson 2007). 
This was the sixth time Obasanjo had increased fuel prices since he became 
president in 1999 (see Table 1.1). Labour unions waited until after the 
inauguration of the incoming government of Umar Yar’ Adua on 29 May 2007 to 
launch a protest, which began with a 48 hour-sit-at-home strike from Monday 4 
June (BBC 2007). The union combined their anger against the subsidy 
withdrawal with what they termed as the ‘sham elections’ that established 
Yar’Adua as president. The protests crippled government operations, leading to 
a cancellation of international and domestic flights, while the streets remained 
empty and government workers were ejected from government offices by 
protesters (Eboh 2007). Eventually, the government agreed to reduce the fuel 
price to N70 per litre and promised not to raise fuel prices for a year. This is after 
what the government spokesperson Olusegun Adeniyi, termed as ‘a personal 
intervention by President Yar’Adua who listened to all concerned parties’, but 
which other actors saw as ‘a strategic move on the ruling party, PDP [People’s 
Democratic Party] to reduce the mounting tensions from the population that felt 
Yar’Adua was rigged in’ (Akanle, Adebayo and Olorunlana 2014: 93).  
The 2012 protests were triggered by a petrol price hike by the Goodluck 
Jonathan government from N65 to N141 per litre on 1 January 2012. The 
government’s subsidy reduction represented one of the highest price increases 
so far, more than doubling the price of petrol (see Table 1.1). The protests began 
within 24 hours of the price rise. Street protests and demonstrations broke out in 
various parts of the country and in the diaspora in major cities around the world. 
It should be noted that these were spontaneous eruptions which subsequently 
received labour union support from 9 January 2012 when the Nigeria Labour 
Congress (NLC) announced their planned strikes and protests, and then 
eventually became the protestors’ representative in engaging in dialogue with 
government. Following these protests, the government, in February 2012, 
inaugurated the Subsidy Reinvestment and Empowerment Programme (SURE-
P), with the mandate to utilise subsidy funds to provide basic amenities. SURE-P 
was set up partly with the funds saved from partial reversal of subsidy. The 
protests also prompted the government to reduce the price of fuel to N97 per litre 
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and galvanised the House of Representatives to set up the Farouk Lawan 
Committee to investigate implementation of the subsidy regime and expose 
corruption (Adetola 2015).  
While not ignoring other protest episodes, we paid particular attention to the 
2012 episode in this study for evidence of whether or not fuel protests lead to 
policy outcomes and the nature of those outcomes. 
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The overarching aim of this study was to investigate the conditions under which 
struggles over energy access in fragile and conflict-affected settings empowered 
the citizens to hold public authorities to account. A methodology that gave 
primacy to a multiplicity of views and actors was adopted: citizens who might 
have participated in or witnessed energy-related protests; activists, unions and 
organisations that might have planned or supported the protests; and 
government officials who might have had input into government response to the 
protests, were all included in the analysis. 
From data from these actors and available documents, we investigated energy 
use in everyday life, conducted a political economy analysis of energy policies 
and protests, and studied energy struggles with a view to understanding their 
impact on empowerment and accountability in Nigeria. The term ‘energy’ is an 
inclusive notion for many products or services. However, the focus of this study 
is on fossil fuels: premium motor spirit (or petrol), diesel, kerosene, and cooking 
gas. These are the fuels over which there have been struggles for access 
(physical access and affordability) in Nigeria and the other study countries 
(Mozambique and Pakistan) for many years. 
2.1 Methods 
A comparative multi-methods design, which combined qualitative data and 
secondary data, was adopted. The qualitative methods were key informant 
interviews (KIIs) and focus group discussions (FGDs); and the secondary data 
was curated from newspapers for the purpose of events cataloguing. Through an 
events catalogue, we developed a database of fuel protest episodes and their 
severity. 
The FGDs focused on citizens’ energy needs, participation in protests, and views 
on government handling of energy issues. Some KIIs focused on the views of 
government officials regarding the government’s subsidy decision making, the 
subsidy process and government response to protests, while other KIIs focused 
on the views of labour unions and activists regarding motivations for, and 
efficacy of, protests. While the KIIs were conducted in Abuja and Lagos, the 
FGDs were conducted in Lagos (the epicentre of most of the protests). 
Newspaper reports of fuel protest episodes constituted the main secondary 
source of data. These reports were used to create an events catalogue which 
enabled us to see not only the frequency of the protests, but the connection 
between episodes as well as the intensity of the protests. The consistency of the 
justifications for, and the means and consequences of the protests also became 
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clearer as we analysed the events catalogue in depth. We developed a simple 
matrix to calculate the intensity of selected protests held in the ten years from 
2007–2017, as a first step towards understanding why some protests escalate 
and others do not. This is described below: 
− Actors: These were the individuals and organisations that might have an 
interest in the protests or in energy matters in general. We identified five 
categories of actors: organised labour and civil society organisations (CSOs), 
informal sector businesses, prominent individuals and politicians, external 
actors (such as the World Bank), and ordinary citizens. The actor score for a 
protest was determined by the number of actor classes or groups that took 
part in it. The lowest score was 1, the highest 5. Where for instance only 
organised labour protested, the protest got 1 as an actor score because 
labour constituted only one actor group. Where ordinary citizens joined 
labour, that made the actor score 2. 
− Actions: What actions did the actors carry out? We identified three categories 
of actions: Talk/negotiate/write press release(s) offline or online; march/ 
protest; riot/disrupt/barricade. The action score for a protest was determined 
by the number of actions recorded. The lowest was 1, the highest 3. 
− Duration: How long did a protest last? We had five categories and scores: 
less than a week (1 point), about a week (2 points), about two weeks (3 
points), between two to four weeks (4 points), more than 4 weeks (5 points).  
− Spread: How widespread was a protest? The spread score of a protest was 
based on the number of geo-political zones it covered. Nigeria has six such 
zones and a Federal Capital, Abuja. The lowest spread score was 1 (that is, 
happening in only one zone) and the highest 7 (that is in all zones and 
Abuja). 
− Impact: What was the outcome of the protest? We identified four possible 
outcomes. No impact = 0 point, government issues palliatives = 1 point, 
government reduces fuel price = 2 points, government combines palliatives 
with price reduction = 3 points. 
2.2 Sampling 
Stratified and convenience sampling were combined in selecting discussants for 
the FGDs. Thus, discussants were selected from low-income and middle-
income4 neighbourhoods because energy issues are largely economic issues. 
 
4  In determining income levels, we first considered the general socio-economic profiles of a 
neighbourhood. However, because in Lagos, people of different income levels live together in the same 
neighbourhoods, we had to apply a screener to help to sort discussants according to income levels. 
Type of occupation was the major screener in this case. Daily wage earners, cleaners, taxi and bus 
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Attempts to have corresponding FGDs among high-income earners in other 
neighbourhoods did not succeed as they were largely unwilling to be involved in 
the research. Table 2.1 summarises the locations and number of participants per 
group. 
Table 2.1 Details of focus group discussions 





Shomolu 9 40s–50s 
Middle-
income 
Bariga 8 40s–50s 
Middle-
Income 
Ikeja 1 8 Mid 20s–early 30s  
Middle-
income 
Ikeja 2 8 40s–50s 
Low-income Maya 12 30s–50s 
Low-income Isiwu 11 40s–50s 
Low-income Imota 11 40s–50s 
Low-Income Adamo 12 30s–60s 
Low-income Ikeja 3 9 40s–50s 
Source: Authors’ own 
Male and female discussants were included in each group in order to make the 
gathering as gender equitable and representative as possible. In Lagos State, in 
contrast with northern Nigeria where Islamic norms prevail, it is not usual to 
separate male and female citizens in public gatherings, so any attempt to have 
had separate groups might have created unease on the part of some 
discussants. Efforts were made to have a spread of occupations included within 
each FGD, as well as ensuring that no more than one discussant was recruited 
from each house or office, to ensure the groups were as diverse as possible. 
Research assistants, being familiar with the city, worked with a screener and 
guidelines to invite discussants. 
 
drivers, roadside mechanics, were categorised as low-income earners, while white collar employees and 
small-scale employers of labour were categorised as middle income. Bankers, managers, senior-level 
civil servants and similar top-level job holders were considered as high-income earners. 
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The selection of respondents for the KIIs was purposive. Organisations 
contacted were the NLC, Spaces for Change, Centre for Democracy and 
Development, Joint Action Front (JAF), Nigeria Labour and Civil Society 
Coalition, Facility for Oil Sector Transformation Project (FOSTER), and BudgIT 
Nigeria. Among activists and labour unions, only members of the executive or 
managerial staff were interviewed. These people were chosen because of the 
leading role they had played in mobilising citizens for fuel-related protests in the 
past. In total, we conducted interviews with eleven activists and labour leaders. 
Similarly, government officials in departments or parastatals connected to fossil 
fuel issues were also purposively selected. The departments included the Nigeria 
National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), Petroleum Trust Development Fund 
(PTDF), the National Assembly, and the Presidency. Interviews were conducted 
with seven government officials. 
Sample selection for the events catalogue began with a search for the dates of 
significant fuel protests since 2000. We identified three major episodes: 2007, 
2012 and 2016. This was followed by a selection of newspapers across geo-
political zones. Care was taken to include pro-government, anti-government and 
non-committal newspapers in the selection. Five newspapers were selected: 
This Day, Daily Trust, The Nation, The Guardian and Premium Times. We 
conducted both an online and hardcopy search of these newspapers, paying 
attention to their reports of fuel protest events, the main facts about the events 
(including date, location, description of the events, number, and identity of 
actors), explanations of the events (such as actors’ grievances and claims), 
effects of the events, and sources of the reports. We expanded the search to 
international newspapers as well using the search descriptors: ‘fuel protests’, 
‘fuel scarcity’, and ‘fuel subsidy removal’. The search yielded 129 reports of fuel 
protests between 2007–2017. The same search descriptors guided the search 
for memes and other popular cultural expressions such as songs, cartoons and 
others. In all, we collected 45 such expressions. 
2.3 Data collection procedure 
The data collection process was sequential, beginning with the events catalogue, 
followed by the FGDs, which were in turn followed by the KIIs. The claims made 
during the FGDs were reflected in the KII questions posed to activists, labour 
leaders, and government officials. Thus, the events catalogue fed into the FGDs 
which fed into the KIIs. 
In conducting the KIIs and FGDs, we were guided by the elaborate protocols 
developed at the beginning of the research. With the permission of interviewees 
and discussants, the KIIs and FGDs were recorded in audio format for later 
transcription. The FGDs were collected by a three-person team, one of these 
was a note-taker while the other two took turns to keep the conversations going. 
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Time spent on each discussion depended on how expressive the discussants 
were, but generally lasted between 45 minutes to a little over one hour. The 
FGDs were conducted between December 2019–February 2020. 
2.4 Validation of the research procedure 
The research procedure was validated at a stakeholder engagement meeting on 
10 July 2019. Following a two-day research-design workshop, we hosted the key 
stakeholder engagement workshop with about 40 people invited from academia, 
government agencies, civil society and energy advocacy/activist groups, 
government agencies, oil producing communities, and the media. The purpose 
of the meeting was two-fold: one was to get input from this broad range of 
stakeholders on the research focus and procedure and tackle any foreseeable 
feasibility challenges; the other was to nurture a relationship that would be useful 
later at data collection and research uptake stages. 
The research team presented the research to the stakeholders, highlighting its 
design, aim, methods and potential uses. The meeting engaged in a thorough 
critique of the research procedures, especially the instruments. Together, we 
generated the list of potential interviewees and the contacts of some of them. We 
also received input into mapping the FGD locations. Importantly, we received 
suggestions on how to disseminate the research findings and got buy-in from 
participants that they would use the findings and support the uptake. 
2.5 Ethics 
Utmost care was taken to ensure respect, safeguarding and the safety of all 
involved in the research. Informed consent was obtained before KIIs and FGDs 
were conducted and recorded. Transcribed data were fully anonymised and 
audio files were stored in a confidential folder to be destroyed later. Though our 
risk analysis showed that the KII and FGD locations in Nigeria had low risk with 
regards to researcher safety, care was taken to be risk conscious throughout the 
data collection process. 
We paid attention to the question of copyright in the use of lyrics and memes. 
The Nigeria Copyright Act allows use of copyrighted materials (including lyrics) 
for research and non-profit purposes. We stayed within the limits of the Act in our 
use of the materials. 
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3. Fragility, social contract, and the 
escalation of energy struggles 
Why do struggles around energy have the potential to grow into significant 
episodes of contention in Nigeria? Is there a link between fragility and the 
observed major movements or struggles around fuel? To explore this, we 
hypothesised that fuel subsidies are an important part of the social contract and 
of social protection in less stable settings with weak elements of governance, 
and in resource-rich/energy exporting countries.   
Despite being a major producer and exporter of crude oil, Nigeria is a net 
importer of finished petroleum products. The findings suggest that several factors 
explain why energy struggles grow into significant episodes of contention in 
Nigeria. These include: resource nationalism and value nationalism, labour 
unions’ national and global reach, erosion of purchasing power, genuine and 
artificial ripple effects of tinkering with fuel prices, and a feeling of injustice and 
anger among citizens. What drives the energy struggles is the belief by ordinary 
Nigerians that they rarely benefit from the huge revenues generated from oil 
export, and that the sector remains poorly governed and beset by bribery and 
corruption. Below we discuss some of these factors, drawing from various data 
sources. 
3.1 Nigeria, fragility and fuel subsidies 
There is a strong belief among Nigerians that affordable fuel prices are a right, 
given Nigeria’s huge oil reserves. Nigerians believe that any reform should lead 
to achieving this right, or at least should not diminish it. Conversations regarding 
fuel pricing are an important part of election campaigns and party politics. As 
such, fuel provisioning and affordability constitute one of the core elements of the 
social contract in Nigeria. One of our respondents noted: ‘If you take subsidy out 
of the picture, to a very large extent a lot of citizens would believe that you have 
breached that social contract which they trusted you with when they voted you 
into power’ (KII 10). The inability by the government to deliver on this, which 
leaves many poor people exposed to the negative effects of high fuel prices, is 
interpreted as failure to ensure security, deliver basic services, and an abuse of 
the social contract. The following comments in our discussions with FGD 
participants confirm this: ‘The way the government is handling the fuel issue is 
wicked. Why are our refineries not working? Why are they importing fuel from 
refineries outside the country built by our leaders?’ (FGD 04); ‘The fuel subsidy 
being released by the government is a hoax because government officials steal 
this money’ (FGD 01). 
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Perceived mismanagement of the subsidy regime has incensed the public 
against attempts to remove it. It is perhaps more useful to see the politics of fuel 
subsidy removal in Nigeria from the perspective of contestations around the 
nature of the social contract, entitlement, and the moral economy. Central to the 
dissatisfaction with state handling of fuel subsidies are factors such as the 
exclusion of citizens from fuel policy formulations, insufficient communication of 
government policy direction, and widespread inherent opacity in the system. 
However, depending on the situation, those elements have manifested 
themselves even when the state was conceived as strong and stable. 
3.2 Escalation of fuel subsidy struggles into major 
episodes of contention in Nigeria 
Episodes of fuel-related protests in Nigeria are caused either by an increase in 
the prices or by a scarcity of fuel products, most especially, petrol. As shown in 
Table 1.1 (Section 1.3), while some of these protests escalated into major 
popular struggles, others remained moderate or almost invisible. Our event 
catalogue, covering ten years from 2007–2017, shows the unevenness in the 
intensity of the protests. In order to assess different levels of protest intensity, we 
came up with five different categories which we described earlier on in Section 
2.1. The assessment yielded the results presented in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1: Protest episodes: 2007 to 2017 
Year Actors Action Duration Spread Impact 
Intensity 
score 
2007 3 2 3 2 1 11 
2008 1 1 1 2 0 5 
2009 1 1 1 1 0 4 
2011 2 2 2 1 0 7 
2012 5 3 5 7 3 23 
2015 1 1 2 1 0 5 
2016 2 2 1 4 0 9 
2017 1 1 1 1 0 4 
Source: Authors’ Events Catalogue 
As described in Section 1.3, the 2007 and 2012 protest episodes were by far the 
most intense in recent history. These went on for many days and involved a wide 
array of actors, including ordinary citizens, civil society organisations, organised 
labour, and opposition politicians. Of all the episodes in our catalogue, the 2012 
event was the only one that recorded deaths. Within one week of the protest, 
eleven protesters had been reportedly killed. The number grew to 15 by the 
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following week. The majority were killed by security agents, while a few others 
died in accidents during the protest. For instance, a motorcyclist and his 
passenger, struggling to escape from being stopped by the protesters, crashed 
and died (Popoola et al. 2012). 
It is also important to note that fuel-related protests have been recurrent. In 
between the spikes are usually small rumbles that keep the subject of fuel 
access in the public consciousness. So, discussions of fuel-related problems 
never really disappear from the public radar.  
It could also be said that the intensity of protests connects with the overall 
perception of government. The 2009 protest was the mildest, followed by the 
2008 protest. This mildness could be connected with the general perception of 
President Yar’Adua as a pro-people president. A few hours before handing over 
power to Yar’Adua in 2007, President Obasanjo increased the price of fuel from 
N65 to N75, but on assumption of office, President Yar’Adua reversed that 
decision, thus endearing himself to the people. It seemed that goodwill lasted 
throughout his three-year tenure which ended with his death in 2010. 
This leads us to the question, why do some fuel-subsidy struggles escalate into 
major episodes of contention in Nigeria? Answering this question requires an 
understanding of Nigeria’s oil economy and politics, and how decades of 
corruption, mismanagement and neglect of vital infrastructure and services have 
produced a lethal mix of dysfunctional politics and governance. For instance, 
Nigeria has four refineries, but poor maintenance and outright sabotage has 
ensured that they operate far below installed capacities. Rice (2012) suggests 
that even in ‘good’ years, the refineries have been able to satisfy at most 25 per 
cent of domestic consumption. The government has had to provide for the 
shortfall in domestic refining by importing fuel, which is sold to the public at 
controlled prices. The fuel subsidies have the aim of alleviating poverty and 
maintaining price stability. It has, however, been argued that they contribute, 
significantly, to the deterioration of the government balance of payments 
(Galiana and Sopinka 2015; IMF 2019a). 
Petroleum exports provide significant revenue for Nigeria. However, the 
revenues hardly translate into observable benefits for citizens, particularly the 
poor. Instead, a large proportion is siphoned off by the ruling elites through an 
intricate web of corruption (Nwachukwu and Chike 2011; Social Action 2012; 
Osunmuyiwa and Kalfagianni 2017). This web of corruption has eroded the 
confidence and trust of many Nigerians who believe the subsidy regime hardly 
benefits the poor, underscoring the basis of the breakdown of social contract 
between the citizens and the state. One respondent explained:  
The poor people who are the ones who come out to fight are not the 
ones that benefit from it [subsidy] but they’ve since been told over 
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and over for years that they are the ones benefitting and they don’t 
know how to check if they are benefitting or not…so the money 
we’ve spent on subsidy are [sic] lost, such that the government 
claim …that they are using it to help the poor people, and barely any 
poor person have benefitted from it. (KII 12). 
In this context—of the government’s inability to meet the daily basic needs of its 
citizens—citizens are left with no option but to provide for themselves these 
basic elements of everyday existence. Affordable fuel is one of the main direct 
benefits that Nigerian citizens, the majority of whom live on less than a dollar a 
day, can get from their government. Due to the fact that subsidised fuel has a 
direct impact on citizens, and is arguably part of the everyday coping 
mechanism, attempts at removing the fuel subsidy inevitably translate into an 
emotionally charged subject with a history of contention and protests. A key 
informant explained it this way:   
It has become basically a cultural and political issue where Nigerians 
believe since we have petroleum and as government does not give 
us anything other than cheap fuel. Let us hold them to account on 
the basis that citizens want cheap fuel and therefore government 
must not go against the wish of the people and raise the price of fuel. 
Emotionally, citizens feel the only thing they benefit from government 
is petrol. (KII 09). 
Before the Goodluck Jonathan administration attempted to reduce the fuel 
subsidy in 2012, there were claims of widespread corruption and 
mismanagement in the oil sector (Okonjo-Iweala 2018). The government 
admitted that a powerful clique had taken advantage of the fuel subsidy scheme. 
In what appeared as a manifestation of state powerlessness, the government 
showed an inclination towards removing the fuel subsidy rather than dealing with 
the so-called clique. When the government suddenly announced a reduction of 
the subsidy, which immediately increased the price of fuel from N65 to N141 (an 
over 100 per cent increase) on 1 January 2012, street protests erupted in various 
parts of the country. The President was accused of unilaterally imposing the hike 
without consultation, in a clandestine attempt to enrich corrupt officials and 
marketers (Gbadeyan undated). The labour unions joined the protests and 
mobilised support from Nigerians in the diaspora and the international labour 
movement. The mobilisation of international support energised the public and 
gave them hope that the protests would succeed.  
From the events catalogue analysis, one major pointer to the escalation of 
protest episodes is the breadth of the coalition of actors. The broader the 
coalition, the more likely the escalation of the protest episode. However, the 
breadth of coalition is a function of the nature of the cause of the contention. 
Nationwide issues such as fuel price increase attract more actors than localised 
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fuel scarcity in a state (which was behind the 2015 protests) or the working 
conditions of tanker drivers (which led to the 2008 protests in some parts of the 
country). 
In the case of the 2012 episode, existing networks of experienced protesters, 
labour unionists, religious leaders, and popular opposition politicians provided 
ready leadership, organisational, and symbolic resources, which energised the 
movement. Besides non-material incentives, the organisers of the protests 
provided the protesters with food and water, which served as inducements to join 
and remain in the protests. An important part of the protests was the use of 
popular media including music, arts, and cartoons. In the section that follows, we 
present a summary of the role played by these media in sustaining the protests. 
3.2.1 Popular culture and the energy protests 
It is difficult to imagine any protest without expressions of popular culture, 
especially songs, drama, and drawings. As a result, a large body of studies has 
emerged on the role of popular media in protests. Mobilising people for ‘action’ 
(van Blommestein and Hope 2012; Olorunyomi 2013); articulating the demands 
of protesters (Valassopoulos and Mostafa 2014); and energising protesters so 
that they can maintain their vigour (Eesuola 2015); are some of the functions of 
popular media in protests. In this section, we summarise the three major roles 
that popular media played in the fuel protests which are the focus of this study. 
In this study, we found that popular culture served as the memory bank of the 
national and global events that were connected to fuel crises. Van Blommestein 
and Hope (2012) see this role as illustrating history and generating nostalgia. In 
Lagbaja’s Suuru Lere (Motherlan’ Music 2000), for instance, he chronicles the 
history of Nigeria from amalgamation in 1914 to the fuel crisis of 2000. Through 
three layers of ‘text’: song, acting and dance, as well as cartoons and newspaper 
headlines as moving backdrops, he highlights what stood out in each of the 
leaders Nigeria had had up to that point. He then focuses broadly on the 
contemporary events in Nigeria of that time: unstable democracy and the lurking 
presence of the military who had just handed over power, rough fights in the 
National Assembly, poverty and a struggling economy, erratic power supply, and 
the tension around fuel prices. 
The lyrics, codeswitching between Yoruba and Nigerian Pidgin, are admonitions 
for Nigerians to protect their newly-obtained democracy through patience and 
cooperation. However, in an intricate artistic balancing, the animations illustrating 
Lagbaja’s lyrics do not preach patience or protection of democracy; rather, they 
focus predominantly on the daily struggles of the masses including power failure, 
poor sales, homelessness and destitution, and contention around fuel prices. 
The struggle between the NLC and the federal government over the latter’s 
attempt to increase the price per litre of petrol from N11 to N30, and the 
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resolution of that contention (a reduction of the price to N22 per litre), are 
captured in the animated backdrop. This is not to suggest that popular media 
functions merely as a passive recording of historical events. Rather, it is an 
active processor of those events with a view to connecting them with the present. 
Lagbaja, for instance, combines carefully selected parts of the past to 
demonstrate a message about the present.  
The second function of popular culture within these protest episodes was to 
present the current problems in a way that compelled attention and evoked 
support for the protests. This second function responds to the question of just 
how bad the situation is, and it usually invites people to think deeply about the 
problem or the reason for the protests (Eesuola 2015). Lagbaja in Suuru Lere 
(2000); Aduke in Hear the Voice against Subsidy Removal (2012), Flavour in 
Nigeria Ebezina (2012), and Tha Suspect in Subsidy (2012, CAPitalHill Music), 
among others, depict the deplorable conditions of fuel supply and access. 
Flavour opens his video with a guard dog watching over a can of petrol, 
suggesting how precious and expensive petrol has become, Aduke and Tha 
Suspect, like Lagbaja, show endless and chaotic queues at filling stations. 
Traditional (non-animated) cartoons have also fulfilled this second function. 
Segun Awosiyan’s ‘What It Seems Like’ depicts subsidy removal as a huge 
sledgehammer (the size of an oil barrel) being unleashed on a figure 
representing the masses who is already blindfolded and chained by poverty. Yet, 
the defiantly raised hands and head of the masses suggest they remain 
unbroken by the situation.  
There are numerous online memes depicting the extent of the problem of fuel 
scarcity in Nigeria. One striking example shows a young man sleeping in his 
room with his can of petrol and a generator chained around his waist with a hefty 
padlock. The preciousness of fuel is emphasised here by the fact that the fuel is 
more important than his phone which is left on his back unprotected. Not only are 
the can and the generator chained, his hands are on them to further secure them 
as he takes a nap. It is important to note that the generator is not as precious as 
the contents of its tank: the fuel.  
Another popular meme shows a dialogue between the then Minister of 
Petroleum Resources and a young man. The Minister was asking to see the 
man’s fuel gauge, as a measure of his wealth/manliness before acceding to his 
request to marry her daughter. This emphasises the telling impact of fuel price 
increase on basic interpersonal relationships. 
Yet another meme depicts a young man in military camouflage sleeping with his 
legs up in his car with the inscription, ‘When there is no more fuel to continue the 
journey’. Beyond the literal sense, this signifies how subsidy removal and fuel 
price increases affected (or affects) ‘journeys’ – ambitions, career and personal 
progress generally.  
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Together, the memes, cartoons and music videos present an unpleasant 
atmosphere of fuel scarcity and its devastating effects on the poor. They are both 
descriptive – stating what was going on; and ‘prophetic’, alerting people to the 
difficulties that awaited their careers, relationships, and future if the fuel price 
increase was not reversed. 
The third function of popular culture in these protests was a reinterpretation or 
reimagining of the fuel crisis. Valassopoulos and Mostafa (2014) identified this 
function of reinterpreting and re-imagining among popular artists in Egypt as they 
gathered in the Tahrir Square during the Egyptian revolution in 2011. The 
reimagining led the protesters to see the link between the current protest and 
older ones, just as they shaped emerging desires and aspirations. In Nigeria, the 
protest media contents and artists reinterpreted and reimagined the problem as 
being beyond just fuel. ‘Discussions’ often connected the fuel crises with wider 
issues including corruption, misappropriation of funds, poverty, and violence. In 
her Hear the Voice against Subsidy Removal (2012), Aduke sings of the inability 
of the ‘common man’ to afford fuel and thus their resort to wailing about fuel, 
food, water, light and shelter. 
Through their songs, artists depict an already trying environment for the masses, 
which then allows them to make the point that any removal or reduction of 
subsidy would be an excruciating blow to Nigerian people. It was 
understandable, therefore, that the 2012 protesters, for instance, quickly moved 
beyond asking for a restoration of the fuel subsidy into demanding better 
governance, an end to corruption, and palliatives from economic hardship. 
It is difficult to specifically estimate the contribution of popular culture to the 
protests against fuel hikes. However, it is clear that it performed significant 
functions of historically contextualising the protests, and helping protesters to a 
better understanding of the enormity of national problems both in terms of their 
weight and nature. In doing this, popular culture, at least, indirectly contributed to 
the sustenance of the protests in the hope for a better deal for the people. 
3.3 Understanding attitudes to fuel subsidies in 
Nigeria 
To understand the immense opposition to fuel subsidy withdrawals and/or 
reforms, it is important to underscore the fact that price increases reduce 
citizens’ purchasing power and income – which may already have been small – 
rendering them almost worthless, and resulting in inflation. Inflation affects micro 
and small businesses, and engenders general restlessness among the citizens. 
Most discussants had unpleasant experiences to share about how fuel price 
increases had affected them and their families on many fronts. One such 
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discussant stated how increases had led to absenteeism, and even dropout of 
their children from school:   
It affected children and their education. Then if you had [a] child 
attending the secondary school in Ikorodu, if you give your child 
N300, it should be enough for transport and their school meal but 
when such a child gets to the garage and they say the transport fare 
is N500, it means he has to take N1,000 to school. If he goes today, 
would he be able to attend school tomorrow? And the child has 
siblings too. It is quite difficult to be giving a thousand Naira daily to a 
child. One may have to tell the child to drop out of school. (FGD 02). 
Such lamentations as this were echoed across all of the FGDs. The impact of 
fuel price increases on businesses, especially small-scale businesses, was 
underscored as well: 
Someone who want[s] to go to market and was given N2000 and 
such a person has already spent N500 or N700 as transport fare, 
(food is compulsory) and the children have not eaten at home. Will 
one return to the market the next day? One would be forced to stay 
at home, so that is my response. (FGD 01) 
Someone who repairs generator[s] and is called for some repairs. To 
go from this place to Ibafo would be quite expensive. If I borrow 1000 
Naira to go, it will not get me there. (FGD 01) 
The ripple effects of fuel increases on the whole economy, and particularly the 
livelihoods of the poor (increases in the cost of transport and food), contribute to 
provoking the people to collective action. People are convinced that through 
mass action, they can demand official attention. As one participant told us, 
‘…you will see that those people became voices, very visible voices…’ (KII 10). 
To explain why energy struggles, tend to explode into major episodes of 
contention in Nigeria, another stated that ‘by increasing fuel price, government 
automatically mobilises the people’ (KII 05). A narration from one of our 
respondents, who has worked in a Nigerian civil society organisation, explains 
how anger and frustration from unpredictable pricing for a commodity that the 
masses depend on can embolden mass action:  
Let’s paint a scenario of you going to work in the morning and you 
boarded a bus and you had an idea of the transport fare. So, you 
tucked a 1000 Naira note into your pocket, the worst case scenario 
you thought of is that you’re going to have change like 300 Naira 
[sic]. On your way back from work, you are informed that the 
transport fare has increased to 1,500 Naira. That information alone 
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turns off a knob in your head and you get angry. Then angrier people 
begin to raise their voices to express their anger. You know that one 
voice raised emboldens others who are just nursing their anger 
internally because of a feeling of oppression, injustice, and a feeling 
of something not being right. (KII 01). 
… citizens protest because they have this feeling that they come 
from an oil producing country, so they should have access to cheap 
fuels and I argued that it is more than that because when we feel 
cheated there is a tendency to protest when we see that we are not 
been treated well and that is different from the feeling of ‘I need to 
access cheap fuel’. (KII 01) 
In other words, while it may appear that fuel pricing is an emotive issue, it is also 
about governance and how the government communicates with its citizens. The 
majority of the interviewees decried a lack of structured communication channels 
to explain the reforms that sometimes lead to subsidy withdrawal and 
concomitant prices hikes. Citizens lack formal channels for engagement (KII 09). 
The following quotes from our KIIs and FGDs are illustrative: 
One of the reason [sic] they take to the street is that they do not 
believe that the available communication channel is adequate 
enough to get their grievances across to policy makers, on the other 
hand the policy makers are not doing enough to communicate the 
impact of the benefit of subsidy removal sufficiently to the citizen, 
and even when they communicate these benefits sufficiently, there is 
still that element of trust deficit between the citizen and the 
government. (KII 10). 
…we do not have access to the government and government is in 
charge. (FGD 03).  
The suddenness of many fuel price increases, as well as the absence of an 
avenue for citizen engagement and dialogue are some of the key reasons that 
fuel protests erupt and escalate. 
3.4 Political and civic space and popular 
engagement with fuel price 
Evidence suggests that there are few formal effective institutions in Nigeria 
through which citizens’ interests can be processed or articulated for redress.5 
 
5  In Nigeria, the Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Commission is the only formal institution 
through which citizens’ interests on issues such as fuel price can be addressed. 
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The political parties, which should articulate their members’ interests, and 
channel members’ demands through to the government for effective resolution, 
have long abandoned such activities. Trade unions like the NLC, and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), provide the government with identifiable 
actors or leaders to reach out to for negotiation when largely unorganised 
citizens take over the streets in protest. Such occasions enable the labour unions 
to demand concessions from the government. Beyond such periods of unrest, 
there is little space for popular engagement with fuel price. 
During the Obasanjo civilian government, the international price of 
fuel became uncontrollable, and the result was shortages of the 
product all over the country, and lots of protest. Obasanjo decided to 
set up a committee that metamorphosed into the Petroleum Products 
Pricing and Regulatory Agency (PPPRA) in 2003. The PPPRA was 
made up of several stakeholders and groups like the labour unions, 
Major Oil Marketers Association, Road Transport Workers 
Association, Road Transport Workers Union, etc. The PPPRA Board 
has about 26 interest groups drawn from across the agency. With 
the interest groups there was more engagement than before. 
However, sometimes fuel prices were not discussed at the PPPRA 
Board meetings before they were imposed. Most times, government 
just decided on price and give public announcement. The challenge 
had always been not carrying people along. (KII 09). 
It should be noted that any opportunity for public engagement is crippled when 
policy deliberations regarding fuel price are rushed, as is often the case. As a 
result, there is no formal political or civic space for popular engagement with 
negotiating fuel prices or other policies. Thus, following subsidy removal, citizens 
along with the labour unions and NGOs often seize the public space to vent their 
anger. It is instructive that no politicisation or restriction has prevented Nigerians 
from taking to the streets whenever they choose. Under both democratic and 
authoritarian regimes, Nigerians have taken over public spaces in major cities 
across the country in protest and contestation to express their opposition to fuel 
subsidy removal. 
It appears that the level of accountability the citizens or protesters can demand 
from a government is directly proportional to the leverage they exact on that 
government. If they do not have any leverage on a government, citizens will have 
limited influence over the government and will thus achieve little with protests. As 
a respondent explained: ‘Protest could once a while become episodic, but 
beyond that, it achieves extremely little in terms of engendering proper 
transparency and accountability framework, because those actually protesting 
have limited leverage over the government’ (KII 10). 
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Actors like the labour unions are able to exert pressure on the government and 
are in a position to actually promote the institutionalisation of accountability. 
However, accountability and transparency in government may not be a priority 
for the unions. In effect, the unions fail to use their leverage to compel more 
accountability and transparency in government. Key informant interviews 
suggested that union leaders do not see a direct negative impact on their salary 
and job, since ‘the government can continue to be opaque or unaccountable, I 
mean they could care less’ (KII 10). FGD participants hinted at this by accusing 
labour unions of using citizens to achieve a salary increase for government 
employees, perhaps to maintain their power and relevance, rather than pursuing 
a broad-based agenda that would improve the livelihood of every Nigerian. 
3.5 Gender roles and participation in energy 
struggles 
Protests around energy reveal an interesting variety of gender roles among the 
various actors. While traditional gendered expectations played out in some 
areas, unconventional roles played out in others. This can be traced along 
expressions of energy needs, organising for protests, participation in protests, 
and in negotiating with government. 
Our analysis of women’s and men’s energy needs as expressed during the 
FGDs indicated a blurring of the line between what men found important 
compared to what women found important (Skutsch 2005; Kooijman-van Dijk 
2020). Whereas everyone agreed that petrol was important, men seemed to 
show as much concern about cooking gas as women did. A male discussant 
opined: 
If there is no petrol, we cannot work. But if there is no gas, our wives 
cannot cook for us. They use kerosene but that has become 
expensive… We use the money we make from going to work to buy 
gas. (Male, FGD 05) 
This is contrary to expectations that depict men as least concerned about energy 
matters related to food and cooking for the household. Furthermore, both male 
and female respondents ranked petrol as important for transport and work 
purposes. This was particularly so among men who operated factory machines 
and women who operated food grinding machines at home or in their shops. A 
key marker of men’s familiarity with cooking gas issues was their ability to quote 
the changing prices of gas, quotes that agreed with those of women most of the 
time. We found this familiarity with prices and ranking of gas in importance next 
to petrol among both low-income and middle-income men. 
 
ids.ac.uk Working Paper Volume 2021 Number 554 





Interestingly, however, there was disparity in the type of adjustment made by 
men and women. While men talked a lot about having to cut down on how much 
they gave their wives as upkeep for the family, or to stay nights at work to cut 
down on the amount spent on transportation, women talked of adjusting the 
quality and mode of preparing food for the family. A female discussant said:  
I hardly cook at home again. We buy food to eat. It is cheaper that 
way. In fact, I will soon leave as I have 5 children to feed and time is 
going, I need to go work for money. (Female, FGD, 04) 
And another said: ‘Before I usually had a huge amount of provisions like 
Bournvita, Cabin biscuits and so on at home, I had to stop things like this during 
that period’ (Female, FGD, 03). 
Mobilising and organising people for participation in the protests was done 
almost exclusively by men. Among our discussants and interviewees, Ayo Obe 
and Joe Okei-Odumakin were about the only prominent women they could 
remember as mobilisers or organisers of the protests. Ms Obe is a Lagos-based 
lawyer and a former Head of Nigeria’s Civil Liberties Organisation, Ms Okei-
Odumakin is a human rights activist and President of Women Arise for Change. 
The list of protest leaders jointly generated during the research inception meeting 
resulted in the names of about fifteen mobilisers, eleven of whom were men. 
Participation has been, however, more inclusive than mobilising and organising, 
albeit in a gendered way. An overwhelming majority of street protestors have 
been men, with women participating by obeying stay-at-home orders from the 
labour unions. An exception is the 2012 major protests in which thousands of 
housewives took over the streets of the ancient city of Daura, Katsina state, in a 
long procession on the first day of protests (Lakemfa 2015: 132). However, our 
discussants could not name one woman amongst the key speakers that 
addressed the crowds in Lagos in 2012. The discussants also recalled that the 
entertainers that kept the protesters occupied in Lagos were also male. 
Unwillingness to participate in future protests was strongly expressed by both 
men and women. The same reasons - distrust of protest organisers, fear of 
repression, protest fatigue, and the inability of protests to produce expected 
outcomes - were given by both men and women. 
Finally, more men than women were involved in the negotiation between labour 
unions and the government as the protests moved towards resolution. The 
Minister of Petroleum Resources and the Minister of Finance in 2012 were both 
women and were actively involved in the fuel subsidy discussions as government 
representatives (Okonjo-Iweala 2018). However, only two women were involved 
in the team of about twelve that represented the citizens and the labour unions. 
The extent to which these ‘representatives’ presented the particular concerns of 
women remains doubtful. Not only this, most of the over 60 organisations that 
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have been involved in organising fuel protests since 2007 have been headed by 
men. 
A gender analysis of the protests around energy access in Nigeria suggests a 
changing trend in men’s energy priorities, and thus suggests the need to be 
sensitive to relying on existing literature on the issue. More recent experiences of 
protests in Nigeria, Benin Republic, Togo, Senegal and Sudan also challenge 
the prevailing assumptions about the masculinisation of the civic space when it 
comes to protest planning, actual protests, and negotiation with governments. As 
a recent study showed, women’s movements and women-led movements are 
rising to challenge the status quo and injustice and are contributing to the re-
imagination of democracy (Aina et al. 2019). Women are no longer hidden, and 
their contribution to fuel protests in Nigeria may need a more detailed 
investigation beyond this paper. 
In conclusion, the anti-subsidy removal protests embody much more than a 
desire by the Nigerian populace to take direct and increasing control of economic 
activity in the oil sector, or what is commonly referred to as ‘resource 
nationalism’. It involves a charge against elite corruption and violation of national 
values. For Nigerian protesters, there is a continuity between bad leadership, 
corruption, inefficiency, elite deception, and price deregulation in the energy 
sector. Fuel subsidy removal becomes a veritable opportunity to protest unfair 
hikes in prices, and corruption, the underbelly of the deregulation of prices. In the 
people’s minds, there is no separation between ‘resource nationalism’ and 
‘values nationalism’. Citizens often resort to street protests because there are 
few or no formal political or civic spaces for popular engagement with fuel price 
or other policies. Thus, following subsidy removal, citizens along with the labour 
unions and NGOs often seize the public space to demonstrate their anger. 
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4. Popular struggles, rights to energy 
provisioning, and accountability 
This section assesses how popular energy struggles might have strengthened 
accountability in Nigeria. As shown in Table 3.1, the 2007 and 2012 protest 
episodes were the most impactful during the period between 2007 and 2017. 
Both these episodes spread across most of Nigeria’s geo-political zones, had the 
highest diversity of actors, persisted for the longest duration, and resulted in the 
government reducing the fuel price. Generally, episodes that led to a reversal of 
government policy or resulted in some other palliative had a number of actors 
involved (see Tables 1.1 and 3.1). Where actors were fewer than 3, the spread 
seemed to be narrower and the duration brief. Such protests also seem to have 
little impact. 
4.1 The 2012 protest dynamics 
The 2012 mass protests over fuel subsidy withdrawal proved that protest 
episodes that persist often diffuse beyond urban centres and gain national and 
international attention. When these protests exact responses from government, 
this may be seen as a form of accountability. Accountability requires that 
struggles have ‘teeth’, or ‘holding power’ of sufficient magnitude to compete for 
governmental action. The protests need to demonstrate the capacity to incur 
significant socioeconomic costs or disruption to major centres, and to attract 
widespread public support or important political champions.  
The 2012 new year ‘fuel price hike aroused popular outrage’ resulting in mass 
protests across Nigeria (Social Action 2012). Over a week of nationwide mass 
actions led to a virtual shutdown of the economy in January 2012. Even in the 
rather conservative northern Nigeria, protesters took the ancient city of Kano by 
storm (Adetola 2015). Within 24 hours of the announcement of the new fuel 
prices on Sunday 1 January 2012, Kano youths started mass mobilisation and 
brought parts of the ancient city under their control.  
In Lagos, Gani Fawehinmi Park (named after the renowned human rights lawyer 
and activist) was the headquarters of the protest where intellectuals, politicians, 
human right lawyers, activists, party leaders, pastors, imams, and popular 
musicians gathered. A year after the protests, the National Mirror, a national 
newspaper, characterised the magnitude of the protests thus:  
Nigerians from across the divide, putting aside religious and ethnic 
differences almost brought the government of President Goodluck 
Jonathan to its knees, when they embarked on [a] series of protests 
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to resist the arbitrary increment in the pump price of Premium Motor 
Spirit (PMS) otherwise known as petrol from N65 to N141. 
(Melaye 2013: 14) 
The labour movement joined the fray on Monday 9 January 2012. The House of 
Representatives weighed in on the eve of the planned protest by passing a 
resolution calling on the government to rescind its fuel price increase decision. 
The executive branch of government ignored the resolution. On the first day of 
protests, thousands of housewives in Katsina State ‘marched through the streets 
of the ancient city of Daura in a long procession’ (Lakemfa 2015: 132). Markets 
and other business premises were shut down in Katsina State as a result of the 
street protests and rallies. The Katsina State chapter of the Nigeria Bar 
Association urged the National Assembly to impeach President Jonathan should 
he refuse to rescind the decision on the fuel price hike. 
‘Spill-over’ protests by Nigerians in the diaspora were held in major cities around 
the world. In the UK, Canada, USA, Ghana, South Africa and other countries, 
Nigerians took to the streets to register their anger at a policy that ultimately 
imposed more hardship on their compatriots at home (Social Action 2012). At 
home, the labour unions internationalised the protest, sending a message to 
Nigerians to protest in front of the World Bank premises in Washington DC. The 
labour unions alleged that the World Bank and the IMF engineered the fuel price 
increase (Lakemfa 2015). Thus, it would appear that in the case of Nigeria, 
protests did enable citizens to engage with the government and somewhat 
achieve ‘voice’. Research participants noted that the protests opened up the 
democratic space for citizens to engage with the government.  
The struggle has always sent a message of caution to the 
government and often forced a compromise between an unpopular 
policy and the demands of the people often leading to negotiations of 
social services which may come as palliatives. (KII 07) 
…you will see that those people became voices, very visible 
voices… (KII 10) 
The question of protests exacting a response from government in Nigeria has 
been documented in studies. For instance, Aina et al. (2019) documented the 
impact of the Bring Back Our Girls (#BBOG) movement. Protests that trigger 
government response often have to be sustained and contain the potential to 
affect the government’s image.  
The 2007 and 2012 protests in Nigeria achieved their objectives partly because 
they were led by strong labour union leaders and eminent personalities (in the 
case of the 2012 protest) whose voices the government could not ignore. In 
2012, after extensive deliberations and consultations with significant sections of 
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the populace, the labour unions and their allies demanded an immediate reversal 
of the fuel price rise. In order to gain ‘holding power’, the labour unions changed 
tactic from talk to marches convincing Nigerians to embark on indefinite general 
strikes, mass rallies and street protests across the country.  
In 2007, the unions questioned why the government was hiking prices despite 
over N350bn being appropriated in the 2007 budget for a pump price subsidy on 
petrol and kerosene (Social Action 2012). In 2012, Professor Tam David West, a 
retired professor of virology at the University of Ibadan and former Petroleum 
Minister, and Dr Izilien Agbon, a Nigerian energy expert based in the US, both 
insisted, rather hyperbolically, that the subsidy itself did not exist (Social Action 
2012), thus opening up speculation as to whether the government diverted 
money allocated for the subsidy into other activities.  
Civil society organisations in particular have been vehement in their opposition to 
subsidy removal. They have argued that what the government has been 
subsidising is corruption and not oil as people have been made to believe (BBC 
2012; Ering and Akpan 2012). They have emphasised the cruel paradox of a 
leading oil producing country that has to resort to extensive importation of refined 
petroleum products. They have urged the government to fix the four existing oil 
refineries and to build more in order to halt the nightmare of importing refined 
petroleum products ‘through their crooked friends whom they camouflaged as 
‘cabal’’ (Social Action 2012).  
Generally, in the cases of 2007 and 2012, the organised wave of the protests 
drew on existing resources such as NLC’s nationwide organisational presence, 
and existing leadership resources in the church and labour organisations, which 
contributed significantly to the success of the protests. The role of these actors 
and their organising capacity is much more pronounced in the 2012 protests. For 
example, Tunde Bakare, the popular pastor of a large congregation in Lagos, led 
Occupy Nigeria. The NLC, the Trade Union Congress (TUC), the Save Nigerian 
Group, Campaign for Democracy, the Nigerian Medical Association, academics, 
and students as well as artisans organised the protests in Ekiti State in 2012. 
These were led by the Catholic Bishop of Ekiti, Bishop Felix Femi Ajakaiye. 
These actors brought their leadership skills and experience to bear. Material 
resources were present too. Protesters were given sachet water and other drinks 
for free. Symbolic resources were aplenty: for instance, Christians and non-
Christians provided security for Muslim protesters when the latter had to pray. 
Popular Nigerian artists performed for the crowd of protesters. 
Struggles over fuel prices in Nigeria have promoted some level of accountability 
and have led to some reforms in the petroleum sector. An example is the 
Subsidy Reinvestment Programme (SURE-P) initiated by President Goodluck 
Jonathan in 2012. The programme was introduced to fast-track development in 
answer to fuel subsidy-related protests. It was designed to complement the other 
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development programmes at the three levels of government, and included an 
investment of funds obtained from the subsidy programme in specific sectors of 
the economy such as maternal health. Other examples including the Ad-Hoc 
Committee (to verify and determine the actual subsidy requirement) and the 
Presidential Committee (to verify subsidy claims on the heels of protests and 
allegations of subsidy scams), have not been sustained (KII 09). While SURE-P 
recorded progress in aspects of social protection and welfare, some of the other 
interventions tightened the process of subsidy reimbursement and reduced 
corruption somewhat.  
Protests strengthen democracy in the sense that citizens freely vent their anger 
when the government appears to be insensitive to their needs. Some of our 
interviewees saw fuel protests as a referendum on the government, a message 
that says government cannot always have its way. One of them said: ‘What we 
are doing partly is putting roadblocks on the road so that government will not be 
able to ride roughshod over the people. They have bumps and roadblocks to 
contend with’ (KII 05).  
However, it is important to note that citizens do not just protest. They have to be 
empowered to believe they can change the situation. From the interviews and 
the FGDs, the role played by organisers and motivators, especially organised 
labour and opposition politicians, in the protests was emphasised. 
Frequent fuel-related protests in Nigeria have created a culture in which citizens 
have been empowered to challenge constituted authority in order to make the 
government more responsive to the plight of the public. This empowerment, 
however, does not seem to have strengthened accountability on the fuel 
importation and the subsidy issues. Neither has it translated to other governance 
issues like a more serious handling of corruption. A respondent observed: 
Protest can just once in a while flash point beyond late episodic 
protest and beyond those episode [sic], it really does very extremely 
[sic] little to put in place a proper transparency and accountability 
frame work, because those actually protesting have limited leverage 
over the government… when government does not need anything 
from you, it’s difficult to be in a position to demand accountability 
from that government. (KII 10) 
Similarly, another respondent argued:  
I don’t think this translates to wider accountability. For example, 
Nigeria’s greatest problem is high public corruption. It is why 
Nigerians don’t enjoy good schools, health, etc. But I have never 
seen Nigerians protest over corruption and challenge it the way they 
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have done over fuel. Holding government accountable in [the] 
energy sector has not spread to other sectors. (KII 06) 
Faced with an escalation of mass protests, governments are likely to make 
temporary concessions to dampen them, while also using police or armed forces 
to repress protesters, and, then, to reintroduce the same reforms that were 
rejected by the people at a later date. An episode of energy protests may, thus, 
be followed by new restrictions aimed at preventing mass protests, affecting the 
extent to which protesters are able to hold government to account over future 
rounds of reforms. 
Our respondents, who monitored and participated in the 2012 protests, felt that 
government actions were ‘effective in terms of cosmetic reforms’ (KII 09). The 
protests were not viewed as a threat to peace and security, but became seen as 
a threat to government survival, after they were hijacked by opposition 
politicians. Government policy position with regards to protest did not change 
either before or after the 2012 protests. Given that accountability is still very low, 
policies since the protests have only cosmetically taken cognisance of social 
protection (KII 09). 
This prompted some of the respondents to suggest that what happens during 
and after protests is a function of ‘power; it is about balance of forces’ (KII 05). If 
the government feels threatened, it can react by sending out troops, which was 
exactly what President Jonathan did in order to stop the January 2012 protest. 
He deployed troops with the instruction to take over the streets of Lagos in 24 
hours. When threatened, government use military force to repress protests. 
Once the streets are cleared, government carries on like there would never be 
another protest. Another government response to the 2012 protests, a different 
potential avenue for accountability, was the legal process that ensued from 2012 
onwards, which the paper now turns to, followed by a discussion of other 
participatory policy spaces that may have opened up as the result of protest. 
4.2 Legal accountability and reforms 
The price hikes that led to the 2012 protest need to be seen in relationship to the 
complex management processes of fuel subsidy schemes. While the 
government claimed in December 2011 it could no longer afford subsidies, in fact 
billions of Naira had leaked through this complex of allegedly fraudulent actors, 
involving the NNPC, PPPRA, Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), port 
authorities, multiple private actors, banks, and politicians (Kayode-Adedeji 2012). 
The nexus of actors involved in Nigeria’s importation and subsidy schemes has 
varied over time, with successive governments having played a prominent role 
themselves. Also, schemes for allocating licenses to exploit oil fields are the 
subject of controversy and corruption allegations involving international private 
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actors (Oseni 2017; Hildyard 2018). Opposition actors have labelled the actors 
involved in the importation and subsidy schemes as a ‘cabal’ that have benefitted 
from subsidies (Ogidan 2020). International private actors have also been 
implicated in such allegations. Research respondents suggested that complex 
connections exist among multiple international private actors or ‘marketers’ using 
the loopholes in tender processes and subsidy schemes. According to one 
respondent, an independent oil and gas consultant (KII 12), there was and 
continues to be a lot of ‘hidden politics’ behind the acquisition of Petroleum Motor 
Spirit (PMS), and the subsidies paid to importers. In the past, this had to do with 
the high number and complex networks of suppliers. By 2011, this culminated in 
an alleged subsidy scam involving shady accounting of payments to PMS-selling 
firms. When the government had accrued a four-year backlog in payments, it 
decided to work with ‘slots’ to regulate the number of suppliers and volume of 
PMS (KII 12). Eventually, under the Jonathan administration, 121 companies 
were added to the subsidy management list, totalling 140 importers (Oseni 
2017).  
The state-owned oil company NNPC is accountable to no one. (…) 
The number of fuel importers rose from 5 in 2006 to 10 in 2007, 19 in 
2008 and 140 in 2011. This decision taken by PPPRA was one of 
the biggest causes of fraud. Many firms only existed on paper and 
collected subsidies on fuel that never existed.  
(Reuters 2015) 
Following the widespread protests of 2012, the legislature decided to investigate 
allegations of sleaze in the oil subsidy programme by setting up the Ad-Hoc 
Committee to Verify and Determine the Actual Subsidy Requirement under the 
chairmanship of Honourable Farouk Lawan. After hearings from all stakeholders, 
spanning three months, the committee reported:  
We found that the subsidy regime as operated between the period 
under review (2009–2011) was fraught with endemic corruption and 
entrenched inefficiency. Much of the amount claimed to have been 
paid as subsidy was actually not consumed PMS (petrol). 
Government officials made nonsense of the PSF [Petroleum Subsidy 
Fund] guidelines due mainly to sleaze and, in some other cases, 
incompetence.  
(House of Representatives 2012) 
While President Goodluck Jonathan faced pressure to dismiss some senior 
officials, it was believed many were his close allies, and it was alleged, though 
not proven, that he also benefited (BBC 2012). Six oil companies and twelve 
individuals faced charges in 2012, including staff of the PPPRA (Abdulah 2012). 
The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) withdrew charges 
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against four suspects (Premium Times 2012). Yet, by 2014, 17 oil marketers and 
23 companies were on the EFCC’s list to face trial (Oseni 2017). Among the 
suspects were key political actors and leaders of private oil firms that operate 
internationally (Mohammed 2012). 
The finance minister set up a technical committee, which later became a 
presidential committee, to verify subsidy claims. The presidential committee 
found evidence of fraud and abuse of the subsidy system. In one instance it 
found that ‘there were subsidy claims for which there were no shipping 
documents or evidence of payments for the products in foreign exchange. 
Various other overpayments, wrongful claims, and breaches of the Petroleum 
Subsidy Fund guidelines also were detected’ (House of Representatives 2012: 
39). 
The landscape for importers of PMS changed in 2017 (under President Buhari) 
when private oil marketers who bought PMS from NNPC stopped importing the 
commodity due to an increase in crude price as well as foreign exchange 
fluctuations (Olisah 2020). The import of PMS then rested solely with NNPC as it 
took over from the private actors. According to our interviewees, this contributed 
again to opaqueness about subsidies as it concentrated the power of exporting 
the crude, and importing the refined, within the hands of the NNPC. Thus, it sold 
crude oil, and spent the proceeds to buy refined fuel, and remitted whatever was 
left to the government as its revenue from oil. 
Some of our respondents believe the government had a vested interest in 
controlling the import, because funds do not go directly into the federal accounts 
but remain with the NNPC, and the presidency and other actors have more direct 
access to these funds. The media drew attention to the opacity of ‘under-
recovery’ in both the NNPC’s and national budgets under Buhari, while the 
NNPC is under limited oversight (AFP 2018). 
The final observation with regard to fuel protests is that following such episodes, 
policy reform proposals should include significant efforts for inclusive and 
participatory policy spaces. These efforts could include consultation with affected 
groups, attention to the impacts of subsidy reforms, specifically on poverty and 
inequality, and policies for addressing adverse effects. Evidence of such spaces 
and participatory efforts, and of their institutionalisation within government 
processes will be evidence that voice and teeth have together strengthened 
mechanisms of accountability to affected groups. 
Our study suggests that often the voices of various citizens’ representatives are 
built into social policies that emerge on the heels of protests. For instance, many 
CSOs gain visibility and popularity when their voices and action get media 
attention. Many CSOs have been strengthened during this process with 
increased executive and legislative interaction. Some of our respondents argued 
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that there is a ‘broad movement in the country in terms of demanding for 
accountability that is not necessarily linked to fuel subsidy’ (KII 06). People are 
demanding accountability from those in authority. Some respondents felt that it is 
this pressure from citizens for example, that led government to start publishing 
revenue allocations to states and local government councils, and to join the 
Open Governance Initiative, which compels governments to publish all financial 
transactions for citizens to see.  
However, the challenge is whether the pressure can be sustained long enough 
to keep those in authority committed to agreed governance changes, or even 
whether such pressure can ensure the piecemeal changes/gains are sustained 
and not subverted by future regimes. For example, in an effort to conserve the 
environment, the Nigerian government at one point agreed to subsidise 
kerosene in order to expand access, and dissuade people from using wood for 
cooking. This became a policy in the 1980s that benefited the poor. Two 
decades later, the subsidy on kerosene was completely removed. Citizens then 
switched to alternative sources, including the use of wood. It is difficult to identify 
instances where struggles have empowered ordinary citizens and groups to take 
more control over policies that influence their energy supply generally; not least 
because protests hardly open the opportunity for meaningful participation in 
policy processes. As one respondent observed: 
There is always very limited opportunity for them [citizens] to 
participate in the policy reforms. Those who even have the little 
opportunity to participate in the process are more of the organised 
civil society, which is [sic] the NGOs and unions but citizens have 
limited opportunity to engage the government. As at today [sic], 
government does not really have any functional feedback 
mechanism for collecting feedback, for engaging the citizen on 
critical issues like this… the only people who can truly engage are 
the unions, NGOs, organised private sectors and maybe few 
politicians. (KII 10) 
Moreover, these struggles do not afford citizens access to policymakers. Instead, 
they focus policymakers’ attention on organised civil society groups and labour 
unions. These groups are the ones who get to sit with government officials to 
negotiate terms of peace and settlement. A participant in a FGD discussion 
noted:  
I believe that NLC know how to stir people up and make them want 
to protest. They do this to get the government’s attention. However, 
when they get to the negotiating table, they do not put the masses 
into consideration. They usually work for their own interests and so 
 
ids.ac.uk Working Paper Volume 2021 Number 554 





many people have become disillusioned and no longer show interest 
in protests. (FGD 04) 
Ordinary Nigerians in the streets who are at risk of injury or death from protesting 
do not have the opportunity to engage with government. It is the visible leaders 
of civil society groups and labour unions who become the voices of citizens. KII 
respondents noted that most of the leaders who have emerged from the 
struggles have become major voices in relation to government fuel-related 
policies, and their opinions and views are regularly courted. This suggests that 
there exists a feedback mechanism between citizens and their government, but it 
has been ‘hijacked’ by the leaders of labour movements, NGOs, and CSOs who 
pretend to be the ‘voices’ of the people while actually serving their own interests. 
To this extent, the fuel protests give them some level of influence with the 
policymakers. According to one respondent:  
Largely speaking, they [protests] don’t lead to actual response from 
government. From our engagement with both NNPC and the 
presidency, there is an understanding/agreement that this subsidy 
needs to be taken away. The resistance we have to the removal right 
now is from his political party (President Buhari’s ruling All 
Progressives Congress), because removing subsidy at the moment 
will lead to a situation that will make the All Progressives Congress 
(APC) unattractive for election so that is the dilemma right now. 
Majority of all their policies are not tied to protest but to priorities of 
those who funded them to power of reality, those who have leverage 
over them. (KII 10) 
In conclusion, when episodes such as the 2012 fuel protests are joined and/or 
led by labour unions, they have the significant effect of grounding social and 
economic activities and effectively shutting down the country. As a result, they 
attract both national and international attention, more so as Nigerians in the 
diaspora embark on solidarity protests in Europe and America. When the 2012 
protest intensified, elite division emerged when the legislature called on the 
executive to rescind its decision. Another common strand in the Nigeria protests 
is how the government reacts. A pattern is common for cases where the protests 
exploded into major episodes: the government makes concession following the 
escalation of the protests, and deploys the military to quell the protests when it 
feels threatened. However, the government does not engage in evolving legal 
restrictions on citizens’ right to protest as a strategy for undermining attempts to 
protest in the future. The government appears to introduce some reforms to 
appease citizens, but the reforms, being cosmetic, are hardly inclusive. The 
government grants the token inclusion of a few protest leaders; but there is little 
consultation with affected groups, and rarely any institutionalisation.  
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Finally, the court cases set in motion after the 2012 protest produced very limited 
accountability as, by 2017, only four individuals were sentenced to jail for 
corruption in fuel subsidy schemes and made to refund the state (EFCC 2017). 
Compared to the total number of firms and individuals indicted, few have been 
sentenced. These prominent court cases have not resulted in more 
accountability in the management of fuel subsidies either. According to Publish 
What You Pay (PWYP) – a coalition working to build the capacity of civil society 
actors in understanding the Extractives Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) 
process and disseminating findings from EITI’s reports - there was no political 
incentive to secure justice under the President Jonathan administration (Oseni 
2017). When the NNPC was in the process of restructuring under President 
Buhari, two private actors received NNPC licenses and contracts while their 
previous cases were still in court (Page 2016). The management of fuel subsidy 
schemes thus remains opaque and outside of public oversight. 
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5. Popular protests and 
empowerment over policymaking 
on energy provisioning 
This section of the paper focuses on whether or not struggles over fuel pricing 
and subsidies caused a shift of power in favour of citizens when it came to 
energy provisioning policies in Nigeria. There are reasons to suggest that 
popular protests do produce some form of empowerment. In their study of the 
#BBOG movement in Nigeria, for instance, Aina et al. (2019) showed that the 
release of some of the abductees would not have been possible without the 
pressure mounted by the movement on the Nigerian government. Not only this, 
the movement also empowered women in diverse ways such as training them to 
be activists who could seek to hold government accountable. 
A cursory look at the trajectory of fuel protests and their consequences in Nigeria 
provokes an affirmative response in support of protests leading to empowerment 
over policymaking. For instance, some of the times that citizens protested 
against hikes in fuel prices, the protests led to either a downward review of the 
pump price of petrol or the introduction of social welfare palliatives or both (see 
Table 1.1). This shift can become an incentive for the next struggle: with activists 
and union leaders reminding weary protesters of the efficacy of past protests. 
The outcome of such successes on a continued basis might be greater claim 
making and a sense of empowerment on the part of citizens. These are both 
aspects of empowerment.  
However, the data at our disposal makes such conclusions tenuous, if not 
outright untenable. First, as noted in the previous sections, the regularity of the 
protests themselves suggests evidence for their inability to effect long-term 
policy shifts that serve the poor. The trajectory is predictable: the government 
withdraws the subsidy and, therefore, the prices of fuel products go up; activists 
and labour unions mobilise crowds in Lagos and other cities, and also embark on 
strikes; protests erupt; the government invites labour union leaders (not activists, 
not the masses) for negotiation; part of the subsidy is restored and the prices of 
fuel products are reviewed downward but not to the original price. The protests 
then end until the government attempts to tamper with the subsidy again. If the 
protests empowered people to influence government policies, that would have 
been at a level that is fundamental enough to preclude the need for future 
protests. 
Our event catalogue analysis suggests that in-between major protests such as 
the ones in 2007, 2009, 2010 and 2012, there were pockets of small protests 
relating to fuel supply and consumption. For instance, in July 2008, Nigeria's fuel 
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tanker drivers began a strike action to protest at high fuel prices and the poor 
state of the country's roads, which they said was a huge hindrance to business. 
This suggests that the issue of fuel pricing hardly ever leaves the public limelight. 
These smaller-scale protests have also not led to policy decisions that solve the 
problem in favour of the poor in the long term. 
Second, the concessions or victory granted to the people as a result of the 
protests have ended up becoming a victory for the government. Both citizens 
and government officials have noted that very often, the government knew the 
protests would occur, it knew there would be negotiations, and that it would be 
forced to come down somewhat on the prices. So, it created a buffer in fixing the 
initial prices. A government official involved in the reform issues said: 
The government would be determined to increase fuel prices and 
would say okay, they want to increase it to N10 from N8 but they 
know that people would scream and shout so they’d increase it to 
N12 so that everybody can scream and shout, and then they bring it 
to N10, which was their original intention. (KII 16) 
It becomes a double gain for the government: it gets the price to where it 
originally wanted it, whilst also presenting the image of a compassionate 
government that listens to, and cares for its people. It also protects the image of 
the labour leaders as people who accomplish change. As an interviewee put it: 
‘So labour would not lose face before their people and government would have 
achieved what they want to achieve’ (KII 13).  
Third, the role of organised labour in the protests invites further interrogation of 
the extent to which protests empower the people to influence policymaking in the 
energy sector. In all the three major and five minor protests under focus, 
organised labour played a leading role under the umbrella of the NLC, or the 
Trade Union Congress of Nigeria (TUC). Joined by activist groups, they 
mobilised their members and other citizens to take to the streets. However, when 
it was time to negotiate, government negotiated with organised labour. In many 
cases, in addition to reducing the pump prices of fuel, government introduced 
palliatives for civil servants. Such palliatives included wage increases. The 
implication is that the ordinary citizens outside organised labour had less to gain 
from the struggles. 
While it is true that protests produced little beyond the façade of partial price 
reduction, it is important to note a proactive policy response from the President 
Jonathan administration in 2012 following the reduction of the subsidy: the 
creation of the Subsidy Reinvestment Project (SURE-P, described in Section 4). 
Even though the government was forced to retain some subsidy, the SURE-P 
project took off and worked whilst that administration lasted; however, it did not 
survive in its original form for much long after.  
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While our research evidence shows that the protests on the whole produced only 
a few short-term shifts, it is important to note that there were occasions that 
protests produced nothing at all. Knowing why some protests yield even just a 
little success, while others do nothing can shed light on the potency of protests in 
influencing government policy. Unlike the violent protests of 2012 which led to 
the creation of SURE-P, the 2016 protests did not result in a change of 
government policy. In 2016, the Muhammadu Buhari administration withdrew the 
subsidy and the pump price jumped from N87 to N145 per litre. The NLC 
followed its usual path. It called a strike and urged people in the informal sector 
to join in resisting what the NLC called the ‘criminal’ 67 per cent rise in petrol 
prices (BBC 2016). For its part, the government argued that the subsidy ‘costs 
the government $2.7m a day and there is no provision for it in the recently 
approved budget’ (ibid.). The National Union of Road Transport Workers, Trade 
Union Congress and some activists organised marches and disrupted traffic in 
Lagos. All these lasted only a few days as most Nigerians did not join the strike 
or protests. The price of fuel stayed at N145 per litre. 
Our inquiry among the citizen members of our FGDs about the reason for the 
difference in their reactions to these two events threw up a number of factors. 
First was the goodwill that the new government of President Buhari enjoyed with 
most people at the time. Whereas there had been a general discontent with the 
government in 2012 as cases of immense corruption in the oil sector were being 
reported regularly, in 2016 there was a higher level of trust in the government, 
being a new administration led by someone who had been known for integrity 
and transparency. A discussant said: 
Knowing who Buhari was in 1985… people were like this man that 
did this, did that in 1985 is coming with something different and that 
we would have something better [sic]. So there was goodwill… they 
were like don’t worry, subsidy will be removed and all [sic]… so 
people were ready to work with him (Buhari). They were like we 
support you [sic], remove the subsidy, things would be better. 
(Female, FGD 07 middle-income) 
Buhari’s reputation as a strict disciplinarian and transparent person with zero 
tolerance for corruption could have helped Nigerians to trust him and accept the 
removal of the subsidy with little or no resistance. 
The second factor was a growing understanding, especially among the middle-
income class, of the nature of the subsidy regime in Nigeria. By 2016, people 
had understood that there was corruption in the subsidy system and that fighting 
for the retention of the subsidy was actually fighting for the interests of the 
‘subsidy cabal’. A discussant put it aptly: ‘Ko si subsidy kankan; sosapo lo wa’ 
[Meaning; ‘there was/is no subsidy; there was/is only pocketing of the nation’s 
money’] (Male, FGD 04; low-income). 
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Another said: ‘People have already been complaining about this subsidy. They 
felt let this subsidy disappear. Let us see the reality’ (Male FGD 07, middle-
income). 
Therefore, one unexpected achievement of the Jonathan administration was the 
exposure of the rot in the subsidy regime and the creation of an awareness of 
that among the people. This later worked in the favour of the Buhari 
administration which followed Jonathan. The Buhari government was also 
involved in a much publicised fight against corruption and the corrupt leaders of 
the previous government. 
The third factor was the role of ‘invisible big actors’ in 2012 which was missing in 
2016. Discussants mentioned how some elites enabled the 2012 protests by 
providing vehicles to ferry people from different locations to the centres of the 
protests; some also provided food and drink to people at the centre, making it 
possible for protesters to carry on for days; others funded protest entertainment 
from famous stars, which again kept protesters glued to the protest centres. 
These invisible big actors did not perform this role in 2016. Members of the 
opposition Action Congress of Nigeria were also mentioned as actively 
motivating and supporting the protests at the grassroots level in 2012. A 
discussant said: 
They gave people money to go and protest. They brought money. 
They made buses available. They cooked food and took it to the 
place of protests, to protest against Jonathan. They were capitalising 
on people’s poverty, but they were working for what they would eat. 
Now they get to power and they’re doing what they like. None of 
them are fighting for our interest. (Male, FGD 06, middle-income) 
The efficacy of these invisible actors in their support for the 2012 protests was 
not doubted by our discussants. These actors were in opposition in 2012 when 
the protests erupted, but in government in 2016 when the fuel price rise was met 
with little resistance. The actors also had the support of the media, and of civil 
society activists in the 2012 protests. 
Protest fatigue is another important factor in the 2016 episode. Rather than 
developing confidence in their own agency and ability to affect the government’s 
energy policy, protesters appeared to have acquired some level of ‘protest 
fatigue’ by 2016, partially as a result of constantly having to revisit the same 
issues without achieving any apparent long-term gains. Some citizens were, 
therefore, no longer particularly motivated to join in protests. A common 
argument is that the so-called concessions sometimes made by the government 
in response to popular struggles were little more than a ‘consolation prize’, 
designed to pacify irate citizens, while also failing to fully address the issues that 
triggered the protests in the first place. A discussant stated: 
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This occurred in Yaba, we joined Gani Fawehinmi for the protests. It 
was as a result of the tear gas that I got the wound that resulted in 
this scar. Many people died, and those that died have wasted their 
lives. Nowadays no one wants to protest. We are resigned to our 
fate. We do not want to die. After all, the government knows that if 
they increase it, people will protest and they will reduce it a bit and 
no one can hold the government accountable. (Male, FGD 02, low-
income) 
Another discussant, who had also engaged in the 2012 protests, expressed 
similar reasons for opting out of further protests, saying; ‘Why should I go again 
in 2016? The one of 2012, what came out of it? What was the result?’ (Male, 
FGD 09, low-income). 
In addition to protest fatigue, some expressed fear that the security agents were 
more high-handed under the current administration than they were under the 
previous one, thus making protests highly unattractive. 
In assessing the potency of popular struggles to empower people in relation to 
policymaking in energy provisioning, lessons from Nigeria show that while 
protests usually follow increases in fuel pump prices, protesters’ demands run 
the gamut of the various aspects of government energy policy. These demands 
in the case of Nigeria ranged from the reversal of petroleum pump prices, to 
other demands concerning management of petroleum resources and oil 
installations, especially Nigeria’s refineries, and requests for an increase in the 
minimum wage.  
However, beyond the occasional reduction of fuel prices, the other demands do 
not appear to have had much impact on government decisions. During the 2012 
protests for example, protesters in Lagos made demands that the government 
should conduct a referendum before implementing the controversial fuel sector 
deregulation policy. A key aspect of that policy was the removal of the subsidy. 
However, while protests yielded a marginal reduction in the initial price hike, a 
referendum did not appear to even have been considered. The policy remained 
in place. On the other hand, protesters in Abuja during the same 2012 protests 
had a different set of demands: they expected the government to not only 
reinstate fuel subsidies, but to unveil an updated budget showing that the 
subsidy funds had been duly reallocated. Protesters in Benin City wanted the 
resignation of the finance minister and further demanded that fuel prices be 
reduced to N39 rather than the pre-increase N65. Needless to say, most of these 
demands were largely ignored. 
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6. Transnational actors and the 
contentious political economy of 
energy 
From the previous sections, it is clear that the activities of actors and institutions 
involved in the oil and fuel sector are complex and opaque. This complex 
landscape is characterised by informal networks between so called ‘marketers’ 
and political actors, including government officials and agencies. Transnational 
actors are part of the landscape. While the perspectives of some international 
financial institutions are visible to the public due to their press statements and 
reports, the role of other transnational actors and the extent of their influence 
remains relatively unclear.  
This section reviews the role of several transnational actors in Nigeria’s political 
economy of fuel subsidies. It remains unclear the extent to which the 
Government of Nigeria is receptive to pressures of transnational actors in its 
considerations about reforming fuel subsidies. 
As indicated in previous sections, the World Bank and IMF, as well as some 
other donor agencies are in favour of scaling down fuel subsidies. For Nigeria 
specifically, the IMF claims the ‘removal of the implicit subsidy would reduce 
income inequality and, if combined with targeted transfers, could result in a 
decrease in the poverty gap while leaving significant fiscal space for other 
productive expenditures’ (IMF 2019b: 23). It frames fuel subsidies as funds 
depleted from important service sectors that benefit the population, and that, 
ultimately, subsidies cost human lives (Naira Metrics 2019a). One academic 
expert indicated that Nigeria has not received loans from the IMF since the 
structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s, hence, the IMF has not been 
able to enforce fuel subsidy reform by setting this as a condition for loans.6 
The World Bank has a larger office in Nigeria than the IMF and a wide array of 
projects and loans. This includes the recent approval of a US$3bn loan to 
improve the electricity sector (Awojulugbe 2019). A few weeks after this 
approval, Nigerians in the diaspora protested in Washington DC against the 
Nigerian government taking on more loans, saying the country would be 
‘economically colonised’ and funds would be corrupted (Ohaegbu 2019). The 
World Bank itself has repeatedly recommended that Nigeria needs to reform fuel 
subsidy policies as they do more harm to the poor than good, along similar lines 
as the IMF (Ojoye 2019). While the World Bank has programmes and 
investments in Nigeria, it has not formally made reform conditional to receiving 
 
6 Pers. comm. with academic expert, 27 April 2020. 
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loans, projects and investments. It is unclear how the IMF and the World Bank 
exercise pressure on the Nigerian government in other more subtle ways or in 
negotiations. The staff of the IMF and the World Bank were unavailable for 
interviews. 
A representative of the NPEC acknowledged that the World Bank and the IMF 
raise subsidy removal in negotiations over loans, and that certain ambassadors 
do not miss any opportunity to state that the Nigerian government needs to cut 
subsidies (interview 13). Yet various research respondents felt that the pressure 
of international actors like the World Bank, IMF, and important donor 
governments and international banks is not effective (interviews 12, 13). In 2019, 
the Minister of Finance, Zainab Ahmed, stated that IMF advice was ‘reasonable’ 
as funds could be used for other sectors, but that the federal government would 
not adjust fuel subsidies as there is no alternative to ‘cushion’ Nigerians (Naira 
Metrics 2019b). Among our respondents, however, some felt that government 
actors, and especially politicians, were more concerned about winning elections, 
alongside benefiting from networks involved in subsidy schemes, than about 
reform: the main reason political actors ignore IMF advice (KIIs 12, 13).  
The Nigerian government has public sentiment on its side when it resists the IMF 
recommendations. The structural adjustment programmes in Nigeria had a 
devastating impact on the country’s public institutions leading to a legacy of 
suspicion. Due to strong antipathy towards the World Bank and the IMF, the 
public does not object when the government refutes advice or conditions from 
these institutions. Additionally, opposition politicians have blamed the IMF for 
being behind austerity measures and fuel subsidy cuts, spinning this as part of 
the protest discourse. In 2012, the labour movement asserted that the World 
Bank and the IMF had engineered the fuel price increase. Suspicion was fuelled 
by IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde’s visit to Nigeria in late December 
2011. Suspicion was also raised when Dr Ngozi Okonjo Iweala, a Managing 
Director at the World Bank, was appointed Nigeria’s Minister of Finance in 2011. 
As a spinoff of the 2012 protests, supporters of Occupy Nigeria staged protests 
at the IMF offices in Washington DC. Thus, the IMF does not just influence 
dynamics around reform by giving out advice: its negative legacy triggers political 
actors to resist or mobilise against reforms.  
As part of the response to the Covid-19 pandemic, the IMF put together loan 
packages for numerous countries. It has offered debt relief to many vulnerable 
economies, but Nigeria was not one of these (Udo 2020). However, the IMF has 
provided US$3.4bn in ‘emergency financial assistance’ under its rapid financing 
instrument to support Nigeria’s efforts in addressing the severe economic impact 
of the Covid-19 shock and the sharp fall in oil prices (IMF 2020). This followed a 
request from the Nigerian finance minister (Carsten 2020) who underscored that 
any IMF loans would be unconditional (AllAfrica 2020; Udo 2020). It emerged, 
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however, that the federal government actually pledged not to reintroduce 
recently removed fuel subsidies. It remains to be seen whether this commitment 
will be kept by the Nigerian government once global fuel prices stabilise. 
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The overall aim of this study is to understand how, and under which 
conditions, struggles over energy access in Nigeria produce accountability 
and empowerment.  
Globally, access to energy has been the reason for many citizen protests. 
However, while some of these produce outcomes such as empowerment of 
citizens or holding government accountable, many do not. While some last over 
a period of time and escalate into major conflicts leading to enduring policy 
decisions, others occur briefly succumbing to government repressive response 
or just fizzle out as protesters get tired, thus, leading to transient or even no 
policy decisions. As a result, it has been important to examine what makes 
struggles over energy access escalate, and what makes them lead or not lead to 
empowerment of citizens and accountability on the part of government. 
Nigeria’s dependence on crude oil exportation, as the main source of 
government revenue, makes the economy vulnerable to international price 
determinations and fluctuations. This means that shocks in the international oil 
markets are inevitably and acutely felt at the national level. In addition to this, 
there is an intricate and sensitive, even direct, link between essential domestic 
consumer commodities and the price of fuel products, such that when the fuel 
price goes up, the ripple effect is felt immediately on the price of essential 
domestic consumer commodities, especially transport fares, food items, and 
house rents. This economic vulnerability and its interconnectedness often attract 
widespread protests in the country. 
The fuel subsidies introduced in the 1970s should have served as the buffer 
between international oil prices and the market pump prices of fuel products at 
the domestic level, and to protect citizens against external shocks. However, the 
Nigerian government’s inability to deal decisively with corruption in the subsidy 
process (a marker of state ineptitude and leadership deficit) enabled subsidy 
costs to rise to levels that could no longer be sustained by the nation, leading to 
the government’s continual attempts to remove or reduce the subsidy. In 
addition, the government’s inability to repair and maintain its refineries, and to 
deal decisively with those who sabotage them (another marker of state 
ineptitude) has made it impossible for Nigeria to liberate itself from the shackles 
of fuel importation, and to meet its domestic needs. This continues to make 
subsidy necessary, and yet unbearable. The government’s continual attempts to 
remove the subsidy invariably leads to fuel price increase, often followed by 
conflict and protests. 
These protests range from mild and brief, to severe and disruptive, the latter 
leading to many days of economic shutdowns and loss of lives, leading to the 
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question: what makes energy protests in Nigeria escalate into serious episodes 
of violence? Answering this question requires paying attention to the two types of 
protests: the short and mild such as the 2016 protest which hardly took off before 
it died down, and the violent and drawn-out such as the 2007 and 2012 protests 
in which several people died. 
7.1 What leads to the escalation of protests? 
Our findings suggest that fuel protests escalate into episodes of violence when 
there is a network of experienced protesters, labour unionists, religious leaders, 
and popular opposition politicians providing ready leadership, and organisational 
and symbolic resources, which energise the movement. These leaders may 
have a keen understanding of the crowd, of how to draw them out, and how to 
sustain their energy. In 2012, these leaders invited popular entertainers that kept 
protesters going for days at protest squares; they also provided material 
incentives – food and water, especially – as well as buses to convey protesters 
from and back to different parts of the city. 
Second, the protests easily become explosive where there is widespread 
discontent with the government. In 2012, there were too many incredibly 
damning allegations of corruption against the government and its agencies. The 
almost daily exposures of fresh corruption cases had turned citizens against the 
government and provided fodder for opposition and labour unions’ speeches and 
mobilisation. This partly explained the mildness of the 2016 protests as citizens 
hung a lot of faith and hope in President Buhari’s reputation as a strict 
disciplinarian and transparent person with zero tolerance for corruption. Even 
when the Buhari government removed the subsidy and the prices of fuel 
products went up high, it was believed to be in the interest of the nation. 
Third, protests escalate when there is no opportunity to discuss fuel pricing 
policy by citizens. Even when such an opportunity existed, the discussions were 
often rushed. In fact, in most cases, avenues for discussing fuel pricing are open 
only after the government has tampered with the prices and tensions have risen. 
Fourth, protests may escalate where there is no protest fatigue. Part of the 
reason that the 2016 protest died quickly was due to protest fatigue among 
citizens. Fatigue sets in when citizens fail to see any tangible results of their 
protest efforts, especially in terms of policy reforms that attend to their demands. 
Protest fatigue therefore affects the capacity of the next protest to push the 
boundary of empowerment and accountability. 
Finally, repressive responses from government, such as those witnessed in 
2012, only manage to hasten the escalation of protests into violent episodes. 
The more heavy-handed security men become, the more violent and disruptive 
the protest seems to be. On the other hand, the harsh response from 
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government in 2012 also informed citizens’ decisions not to participate in 
subsequent protests. 
7.2 Do protests result in, or support, 
accountability and/or empowerment? 
Another concern of this study is to examine whether or not fuel protests 
promoted accountability in Nigeria. It seemed struggles over fuel prices in 
Nigeria have promoted some level of accountability, especially in cases such as 
2012 where protests led to policy decisions and actions by the government. Such 
decisions and actions, however, easily collapse because of lack of consistent 
demand by citizens, and sometimes because of a change in the political regime. 
Frequent fuel-related protests in Nigeria have created a culture in which citizens 
have been empowered to challenge constituted authority in order to make the 
government more responsive to their plight. Whilst the government now knows it 
is challenged, it has still not strengthened accountability nor dealt with the 
importation and subsidy issues. Neither has the challenging translated to dealing 
with other governance issues like corruption. 
Faced with an escalation of mass protests, Nigerian governments have made 
temporary concessions to dampen the protests, while also using police or armed 
forces to repress protestors, and then subsequently reintroducing the subsidy 
reforms at a later date. Such repressive responses to protests portray the 
government as unwilling to brook protests. This has the tendency to further 
narrow the extent to which protests would be deployed for accountability 
purposes.  
Closely tied up with the accountability question is the extent to which energy 
protests empowered citizens over energy provisioning policymaking. For more 
than half of the times that citizens protested over a reduction of the subsidy, the 
protest led to either a downward review of the pump price of petrol or the 
introduction of social welfare palliatives or both. However, it is difficult to 
conclude based on this that the protests empowered citizens. This is because 
energy policy making in Nigeria is complex, carried out amongst an array of 
vested interests lodged in both national and international entities, determined by 
knowledge and expertise not easily available to the ordinary citizen, and often 
conducted with little or no transparency. Empowerment in such a process would 
need to be evidenced by public and open consultations, access to data and 
information, and representation of ordinary citizens in the governance and 
determination of such policies. In spite of the role of the Nigerian federal 
legislative houses, this is not often or effectively the case. However, in 2012, the 
federal legislative organs did respond to, and institute processes to attack some 
of the irregularities in the management and governance of the Nigeria fuel 
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subsidy regime. The 2012 protests did lead to some official response, but we are 
unable to conclusively declare that it empowered citizens to demand and 
continuously extract legislative oversight of the oil sector from their elected 
representatives. 
First, the regularity of the protests themselves suggests their inability to effect a 
long-term policy shift that serves the poor. Second, the concessions or victory 
granted to the people as a result of the protests ended up becoming 
appropriated as a victory for the government. As a response to the protests, 
government often managed to ‘reduce’ the price to where it originally had 
intended it to be, yet make it look like the protesters had won. Third, the bulk of 
the benefit often went to organised labour, who amplified their voices in 
negotiating with government, in some cases obtaining personal or unionised 
gains in the process. This is despite the fact that the protests were embarked 
upon by people from all sectors, including the unemployed. 
In assessing the potency of popular struggles to empower people on 
policymaking in energy provisioning, lessons from Nigeria show that while 
protests usually follow increases in fuel pump prices, protesters’ demands run 
the gamut of the various aspects of government energy policy. These demands 
in the case of Nigeria ranged from the reduction of petrol pump prices, to other 
demands concerning management of petroleum resources and oil installations, 
especially Nigeria’s refineries. Recurrently, they included requests for an 
increase in the minimum wage. However, beyond the occasional reduction of 
fuel prices, the other demands do not appear to have had much impact on 
government decisions or citizens’ capacity to consciously demand that their 
representatives in parliament provide the required oversight for the oil sector.  
As a result, on the whole, citizens do not seem to feel empowered. They are 
largely uninformed about existing policies, unsure about policy change 
processes and convinced that the government is inaccessible so there is no 
point embarking on protest or policy change efforts. 
7.3 What role do international actors play in these 
crises? 
The final concern of this study is the role of transnational actors in the energy 
access crises. The World Bank and IMF, as well donor agencies, are seen to be 
in favour of scaling down fuel subsidies. For Nigeria specifically, the IMF claims 
the ‘removal of the implicit subsidy would reduce income inequality and, if 
combined with targeted transfers, could result in a decrease in the poverty gap 
while leaving significant fiscal space for other productive expenditures’ (IMF 
2019b: 23). Along similar lines as the IMF, the World Bank too has repeatedly 
recommended that Nigeria needs to reform fuel subsidy policies as they do more 
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harm to the poor than good. It however remains unclear the extent to which the 
Government of Nigeria is receptive to pressures of transnational actors in its 
considerations about reforming fuel subsidies, casting doubts on the efficacy of 
the externally driven recommendations. 
What is clear, however, is the active collaboration of transnational actors in 
maintaining the opacity around the fuel subsidy process. First of all, oil firms 
have international networks and use loopholes in registrations and licensing to 
enable their actions to benefit from the schemes. Secondly, individual actors 
involved in subsidy corruption have been enabled by transnational financial 
networks that enable illicit flows of money. 
It is also clear that transnational actors have supported the Government of 
Nigeria in fighting the subsidy scam. For instance, courts outside Nigeria have 
helped in bringing some of the beneficiaries of the scam to book. An example is 
the CEO of Capital Oil (Ifeanyi Ubah) who was charged by a court in the UK and 
had assets frozen worldwide - a process which required international actors’ 
help. 
7.4 Lessons on action for empowerment and 
accountability 
We return to the question: did energy struggles empower people to hold 
public authorities accountable over energy demands in Nigeria? Our 
response to this question can be framed in the form of key lessons. 
Lesson 1: Struggles over access to energy often yields some response from 
government (accountability) but those who benefit maximally from this response 
are usually not the marginalised and less powerful people who form the bulk of 
the protesters. Struggles over energy access in Nigeria, especially protracted 
ones, often end up in government negotiating with the labour unions. 
Interestingly, the majority of those on the streets protesting are not members of 
organised labour, and they do not have an organised platform on which they can 
negotiate with the government. In a sense, therefore, protests over energy 
access empower labour unions, not the people, to negotiate with the government 
over energy access. While the result of the negotiations is often a downward 
review of energy prices which benefits both labour and other citizens, labour 
often succeeds in extracting extra benefits for its members that do not extend to 
those in the informal sector or private sector, or the unemployed. Among these 
non-beneficiaries are the poorest of the poor. This largely corresponds with the 
doubts expressed about unruly struggles by Hossain et al. (2018:37) that ‘energy 
protests can sometimes pack a powerful political punch, it is not clear to what 
extent marginalised and less powerful groups benefit from the gains achieved, 
either materially or in terms of enduring forms of political power’.  
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Lesson 2: Genuine energy protests can become a platform for opposition 
politicians who capitalise on the government’s failure to achieve their political 
goals, and attain political power for their parties and themselves. These 
politicians portray their involvement and investment in the protests as being in 
the interests of the poor and of the nation, rather than a self-serving political 
investment. The protesting crowd is a multitude with varying and sharply different 
motives. Therefore, in trying to understand if popular struggles work, it is 
important to ask: work for whom and for what? 
Lesson 3: While energy access protests often led to a downward review of fuel 
prices, they hardly ever lead to any long-term organisational, structural and/or 
governance changes. In other words, the ‘victories’ recorded by the protesters 
(such as price reduction and even wage increases) are short term and 
ephemeral and have soon been caught up by inflation. In some exceptional 
circumstances where (envisaged) protests led to the establishment of an 
elaborate social support agency, the agency worked fully for only as long as the 
regime that established it was in government. Scholars of empowerment and 
accountability are often wary of accountability that ends up being tokenistic 
rather than a genuine response to citizens’ requests (Hossain et al. 2018). This 
lack of sustainable and enduring change is a manifestation of the nature of the 
state, politics and its institution, a condition that makes it possible for a new 
government to overrule, abandon and starve existing programmes and agencies. 
Lesson 4: Protests originally targeted at improved energy access hardly remain 
so for long (Hossain et al. 2018). Often, they spiral into wider demands for good 
governance, for an end to corruption, and for a severance of the relationship with 
transnational actors, especially the IMF and the World Bank. In fact, the 
demands of protesters in Nigeria once involved the removal of cabinet ministers, 
and the president’s resignation (See also Aina et al. 2019). 
Lesson 5: The activities of transnational actors can be, on the surface, difficult to 
place and describe. Yet there are strong indications that they play a role in 
pushing for subsidy reduction. Therefore, attempts to understand the role of 
transnational actors must probe beyond their official claims and actions. 
Lesson 6: For energy struggles to empower people to hold public authorities to 
account, however ephemerally, there is a need for some organising and 
significant resources. Notably, the skills and resources for these are hardly ever 
found among the less powerful and marginalised. This not only casts doubt on 
the widespread popularity of the protests, but also raises the likelihood that 
whatever concessions or benefits emerge as a result of the protests must first 
cater to the interests of the organisers and funders. 
The outcomes of the struggles over energy access in fragile and conflict-affected 
contexts are severely limited by the very conditions that define the settings as 
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fragile: weak institutions, elite capture, widespread corruption, and a citizenry 
that is protest-fatigued and disempowered. Frameworks that open up the civic 
space for dialogues between government and the citizens might produce better 
outcomes than protests do. Such spaces must widen and deepen the norms, 
institutions, values and practices of democracy in such a way that citizens, and 
their collective groups and associations are willing and able to effectively engage 
governmental actors and their agencies in encounters and dialogues that 
enhance opportunities to map out, implement and promote lasting policy options 
in the energy sector. 
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Table A1 Chronicle of fuel-related protects in 
Nigeria 
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*2017 protest was about fuel scarcity, not about price increase 
Source: Authors’ own 
Table A2 Not all fuel price increases attracted 
protests: 2007–20 
Year President Increase Increase % Protest 
2007 Olusegun Obasanjo N65 to N75 15.4% increase Yes 
2012 Goodluck Jonathan N65 to N141 116.92% increase Yes 
2016 Muhammadu Buhari N87 to N145 66.67% increase Mild to 
None 
2020  Muhammadu Buhari N145 to N124 14.5% decrease 
(market forces) 
None 
2020  Muhammadu Buhari N124 to N123 0.81% decrease 
(market forces) 
None 
2020 Muhammadu Buhari N123 to band 
of  
N140-N145 
Market forces None 
2020 Muhammadu Buhari Band of 
N140-N145  
to band of 
N145-N148 
Market forces None 
2020 Muhammadu Buhari Band of 
N145-N148 to 
price cap of 
N151 
Market forces None 
Source: Authors’ own 
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Table A3 Timeline of events for three major 












2007 29 May 29 May 18 
June 
21 June 23 June 24 
June 
2012 01 Jan 02 Jan 4 Jan 05 Jan 13 June 19 Jan 
2016 14 May - 19 May 20 May - - 
Source: Authors’ own 
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